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AVIATION ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION:
FUNCTIONAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
C. 0. MILLER*
T HIS ARTICLE is a product of the author's twenty-five years
of experience in the area of aviation accident investigation,
and has been prepared to provide insight into the legislative his-
tory of the civil aviation accident investigation process, and into
its current procedures and problems. Special attention is given to
the issue of "probable cause" in aviation accidents. While this
study is aimed principally at members of the legal profession, it is
hoped that it also will be of assistance to those persons and agen-
cies charged with accident investigation responsibilities.
AVIATION DYNAMICS AND THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF INVESTIGATION
The Birth of Air Transportation
Powered flight had its origin three quarters of a century ago
when the Wrights took to the sky in 1903. Aviation as a medium
for air transportation did not first appear until after World War I.
Surplus pilots and aircraft, along with budding technology, were
by-products of the war. Classic Yankee ingenuity resulted in the
commercial application of the airplane to various areas, including
barnstorming, aerial photography, advertising and crop dusting.
While transportation of cargo and passengers on a scheduled basis
* Mr. Miller holds a B.S. in Aeronautical Engineering from M.I.T., a M.S.
in Systems Management from the University of Southern California, and a J.D.
from Potomac School of Law. He was a pilot during World War II with the
Marine Corps, and one of the first air safety engineers in the aerospace indus-
try. In addition, he was the Director of Research at the U.S.C. Institute of
Aerospace Safety and Director of the Bureau of Aviation Safety of the NTSB.
Currently, Mr. Miller is President of System Safety, Inc. in McLean, Virginia.
IN. KoMONs, BONFIRES TO BEACONS, ch. 1 (US. Gov't Printing Off., 1978).
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had begun in the United States in 1914,2 it was not until the early
1920's that several fixed base operators began what would be
known today as air taxi operations. The turning point occurred
when the Department of the Post Office developed air mail routes
with operational if not financial success.
The initial moves toward federal regulation of aviation did not
happen easily. However, major groups of aviation enthusiasts fore-
saw little growth in the transportation of people and cargo unless
accident prevention could be enhanced, a goal federal regulation
could promote. The Air Commerce Act of 19268 was the first fed-
eral law in the United States to govern civil aviation. The Act
granted broad authority to the Secretary of Air Commerce, under
the Department of Commerce, to ensure a high level of safety
and to "investigate, record and make public the causes of acci-
dents in civil air navigation."' By 1927, when record-keeping be-
gan, United States civil aviation involved 1,572 certified airmen,
2,740 certified aircraft and 1,036 civil airports. Twenty-five air
carrier accidents occurred in that year; four were fatal, killing five
persons. General aviation experienced 253 reported accidents;
95 were fatal, killing 146 persons.'
In the early 1930's, a transition in the industry from the use of
war surplus aircraft to sleek twin-engine low-wing transports was
made. Transcontinental air travel became something other than
fortuitous arrival at the intended destination somewhere near the
scheduled time. By 1937, the number of certificated airmen had
risen to 17,681, the number of civil aircraft to 10,836, and the num-
ber of airports to 2,229. The number of air carrier accidents totalled
42, five of which were fatal, and general aviation experienced
1,900 accidents, 184 of which involved fatalities. The total
number of deaths was only 237 (52 in air carrier accidents and
2 d. at 16.
'Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
4 1d.
5 These and similar data were derived from annual reports by Federal civil
aviation authorities, initially the Commerce Department, later the Civil Aero-
nautics Administration (CAA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Usually entitled STATISTICAL
HANDBOOK OF CIVIL AVIATION, these reports can be reviewed readily at the FAA
Library, 800 Independence Ave., S.W., Washington, D.C. Data cited in this paper
is selected primarily from the 1964 edition and editions issued within the past
two years.
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184 in general aviation), not a bad record considering the primi-
tive equipment and facilities utilized and the general lack of un-
derstanding of the hazards of flight.
Nevertheless, public interest in aviation accidents was heightened
by losses of prominent persons, including Knute Rockne's death
in 1931 and that of Will Rogers and Wiley Post in 1935. Events
such as the Hindenberg crash in 1937 also captured the public's
attention. Modifications to the Air Commerce Act were made in
1934 and in 1937 to strengthen the accident investigation process.
The Secretary of Commerce was specifically authorized to hold
public hearings to inquire into the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding aircraft accidents, to subpoena and to examine witnesses
and documents, and to make public statements regarding the
causes of the accidents! The amendments to the Act also pro-
hibited use of the Secretary's reports in any suit or action arising
from any accident.!
In 1937, pursuant to the Air Commerce Act, the Secretary
adopted administrative regulations establishing procedures for
aviation accident investigation.! These regulations established with-
in the Department of Commerce a five-member accident investi-
gation board composed of three department employees and two dis-
tinguished persons, the latter functioning only as advisors. Regu-
lations pertaining to investigative responsibility, public hearings
and use of reports in litigation remained unchanged.
The most significant accident of the 1930's for the aviation
industry was the May 6, 1935 crash which took the life of Senator
Bronson M. Cutting of New Mexico. Cutting was a passenger in
a TWA DC-2 traveling from Albuquerque, New Mexico to Kansas.
The plane, the victim of uncoordinated weather reporting and un-
reliable navigation equipment, crashed in a small Missouri town."
a Air Commerce Act of 1926 as amended by Pub. L. No. 73-418, 48 Stat.
1113 (1934).
71d. § 2(e).
' Civil Air Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 91.0-91.37 (1939) (note especially §§ 91.2,
91.21, 91.34). Instrumental in this effort were Professors J. H. Wigmore and
Fred D. Fagg, Jr., of the Northwestern University School of Law. Prof. Wigmore
later became the leading scholar in the evidence segment of law. Dr. Fagg became
the President of the University of Southern California (1947-1957), a position
from which he was able to endorse the first university-level training in aircraft
accident investigation.
9N. KOMONS, THE CuTrNG AIR CRASH (F.A.A. 1973).
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The political furor following this accident was unparalleled in any
prior air transportation mishap. The Cutting crash resulted in the
recognition of the importance of the airways system within the
United States and of the organized use of qualified personnel pro-
tected from political influence in investigations. The Department
of Commerce attempted to refine its regulatory and investigative
processes, but Congress began to look for a more effective aviation
statute after losing one of its colleagues." The hoped for solution
was the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938" which repealed large por-
tions of the Air Commerce Act and consolidated all aviation
functions into an agency called the Civil Aeronautics Authority.
The "Authority" was composed of three departments: the
formal Civil Aeronautics Authority itself; a five-member group
whose chairman was appointed by the President; an Administrator,
an independent executive within the "Authority;" and an inde-
pendent Air Safety Board. The promulgation of safety rules and
economic regulations was to be performed by the five-member
group in a quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial fashion." Airport con-
struction and maintenance, air traffic control, and other opera-
tional functions were to be directed by the Administrator." The
Air Safety Board was to investigate accidents and make determi-
nations of probable cause, release its findings to the public, recom-
mend measures to prevent accidents, and make the rules necessary
to fulfill all of these functions. The members of the Air Safety
Board were presidential appointees; one member was required to
be an active airline pilot at the time of his appointment." The
Board was to operate independently of the other two departments
of the "Authority,"" a concept which has continued to the present.
From the beginning the Act of 1938 was beset with organiza-
tional problems and difficulties with interpersonal relationships.
There was a conflict in the basic term "Civil Aviation Authority"
because it was used in two different senses. In certain paragraphs
'
01d. at 79-80.
11 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
1 d. §5 201(a), 205.
'
3ld. §§ 201(b), 302(a).
'Id. § 701(a). All three of the first Air Safety Board appointees were pilots
and Air Corps Colonels. Chairman Thomas Hardin was an airline pilot. Sumpter
Smith was a civil engineer and C. B. Allen was a journalist.
" Id. S 702(a).
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of the Act it meant the five-member board, while in others it de-
noted the agency as a whole. Furthermore, the law created over-
lapping rule-making and adjudicative functions."
Regarding accident investigations, a Commerce Department
memorandum stated:
The chief weakness of our present accident investigation lies in
the fact that the investigatory body has no power to change any
safety rules. All it can do is to report the probable cause of the
accident to the rule-making body and make recommendations for
changes in the safety rules designed to prevent similar accidents
in the future. The rule-making body, the Authority, may accept
or reject such recommendations. (emphasis in the original)"
Accordingly, in order to provide remedies for the above defect
and to simplify the lines of reporting to the President through the
Department of Commerce, Reorganization Plans II and IV were
adopted in 1940." Two separate agencies were established, the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the Civil Aeronautics Ad-
ministration (CAA). Both were placed under the control of the
Department of Commerce; however, the CAB was placed there for
"administrative housekeeping purposes only:"
[T]he Civil Aeronautics Board shall exercise its functions of rule-
making (including the prescription of rules, regulations and
standards) adjudication, and investigation independently of the
Secretary of Commerce ... ; [t]he budgeting, accounting, per-
sonnel, procurement and related routine management functions of
the Civil Aeronautics Board shall be performed under the direc-
tion and supervision of the Secretary of Commerce ....
The Air Safety Board was abolished, but its investigative function
remained intact through the continuation of a Bureau of Safety.
Further, the rule-making function governing the operation of the
16 BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, SUMMARY OF CIVIL AERONAUTICS STUDY . . .
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM (1940).
17 Memorandum from Undersecretary of Commerce E. J. Noble to Secretary
Hopkins, Memo in Support of the Aviation Provisions of Reorganization Plans
III and IV (Apr. 23, 1940).
isTmRo PLAN ON GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION, H.R. Doc. No. 681, 76th
Cong. (1940); FOURTH PLAN ON GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION, H.R. Doc. No.
692, 76th Cong. (1940) [hereinafter cited as FOURTH PLAN]; Pub. Res. 75, 76th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1940).
9 See F. ROOSEVELT, FOURTH PLAN ON GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION, supra
note 18, at 5 7(C).
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civil aviation system became part of the CAB, together with the eco-
nomic regulatory function. This approach was to continue until
passage of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958."
The Post-World War II Era
During the years between the beginning of World War II and
the beginning of the Korean conflict, aviation in the United States
grew at a tremendous rate. The number of civil aircraft rose four-
fold, and the increase in certificated airmen was even greater.
Technological developments produced remarkable improvements
in the capacity of the air transportation system. However, the
system became more difficult to operate because of increased com-
plexity. Accidents began to occur, again becoming the catalyst
for changes in the administration of aviation and in the accident
investigation laws.
The "Pearl Harbor of commercial aviation" occurred in early
1952 with the crash of two transports within three weeks near
Newark, New Jersey, followed by two other crashes in the greater
New York area. Fourteen of the sixty-eight deaths occurred on
the ground."' On June 30, 1956, the accident labeled the "no
greater evil" accident occurred when a TWA Constellation
collided with a United Airlines DC-7 over the Grand Canyon,
resulting in a loss of 128 lives. That accident followed a prophetic
warning about the potential of losing "120 people in a single acci-
dent" which had been made by Carl Christianson, Director of
Safety of United Airlines, at a Flight Safety Foundation seminar
in Taxco, Mexico in November, 1955. Other prominent aviation
officials also had voiced similar concerns early in 1956; hence,
when the accident occurred the cries from the media were inevit-
able, for example: "How many more people will have to be killed
in mid-air collisions before the government and the airline industry
will take effective action. . .. "n
The CAB's Bureau of Safety (BOS), which had rule-making au-
thority and accident investigation responsibilities, responded by pro-
mulgating more positive air traffic control rules. These immediately
2049 U.S.C. §5 1301-1542 (1976).
21 S. ROCHESTER, TAKEOFF AT MID CENTURY (U.S. Gov't Printing Off. 1976)
[hereafter cited as ROCHESTER].
2 Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 16, 1956, at 21. See also ROCHESTER, supra
note 21, at 318.
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encountered resistance from the United States Air Force which
considered restriction of airspace operations detrimental to its
mission. After a series of "bloody sessions" among various interest
groups and the Air Force regarding the rules, the debate became
politically moot when, on April 21, 1958, a United States Air
Force F100 collided with a United Airlines DC-7 near Las Vegas,
Nevada, killing the two military pilots and forty-seven persons
aboard the transport. A month later a National Guard T33 col-
lided with a Capital Airline Viscount outside Washington, D.C.,
killing all eleven occupants of the Viscount.
Pressure had been building on the federal government through-
out the 1950's as the airways system and the entire bureaucracy
were failing to keep pace with the burgeoning scope and tech-
nology of aviation. By 1957 there were over 700,000 certificated
pilots, over 90,000 aircraft and 6,400 airports.' Four to eight
fatal air carrier accidents had been occurring annually since the
beginning of the 1950's. While the maximum loss of life in any
year was only 177 (1955), the potential for massive aviation acci-
dents was frightening. In addition, general aviation was suffering
3,500-4,000 accidents in this period, killing six to seven hundred
people per year. Even this field predominated by the private pilots
had its high visibility accidents; the president of Braniff Airlines
was killed in a light plane accident in January, 1954."'
The jet era, which heralded the beginning of supersonic flight,
also arrived in the 1950's. This era signalled a greater challenge to
the beleaguered civil aviation community which was already fail-
ing to cope adequately with safety matters, at least in the eyes of
the public. Thus, when the aforementioned accidents drew public
attention and spawned Congressional furor, comprehensive legis-
lation became inevitable. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was
the result.'
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958
Passed in record time,' the Federal Aviation Act addressed
2 See note 5 supra.
24 Id.
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
2This Act was passed August 14, 1957, but had an amendment attached
requiring the Administration to submit by January 15, 1959, "a program of re-
organization establishing an independent aviation authority, following the ob-
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several major issues. For purposes of this paper, however, the
only question is how many of the functions of the CAB, if any,
were to be assumed by the new agency. A consensus was event-
ually reached that the rule-making function should be deleted
from the CAB's authority. This idea was based upon the argu-
ment that the FAA's administration of the aviation system would
be incomplete without the rule-making function since the direc-
tion of actions and their enforcement are fundamental manage-
ment prerogatives.
An intensive debate also occurred concerning the organizational
location of the accident investigation function. It was argued that
investigators might be slow to criticize their own past efforts in rule-
making when subsequent accidents adversely reflected on their
credibility. Hence, under Title VII of the Acf the CAB was
given the air safety investigation responsibility which granted them
the authority to make rules and regulations governing notification
and reporting of accidents; to obtain assistance from other gov-
ernment agencies, including the FAA, as necessary; and to deter-
mine the facts, conditions and circumstances and the probable
cause of accidents. The CAB also was to make recommendations
to the FAA Administrator that, in its opinion, would tend to pre-
vent similar accidents in the future; to conduct special studies per-
taining to the prevention of accidents; and to preserve and other-
wise examine aircraft parts and property involved in an accident
and, in the case of fatal accidents, to have autopsies conducted.
It also was to direct investigations when civil and military air-
craft were both involved."
The FAA was given a specific role in air safety investigations
to discharge its rule-making and enforcement duties properly, to
monitor the performance of its employees and to protect the gov-
jectives and conclusions of the Curtis report." The Federal Aviation Act was
introduced in the Congress May 21, 1958, and was signed into law by President
Eisenhower Aug. 23, 1958. See Hearings on Airways Modernization Bd. before
the Senate Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
30-37, 39-46 (1957). The Act was passed quickly because of background studies
conducted by the Curtis Committee in its development of the Airways Moderni-
zation Act.
27Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 § 701
(1958).
8 1d. S 302(e)(1).
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ernment in the event of tort liability actions." The Act further
provided that the CAB reports relating to an accident or investi-
gation would not be admissible as evidence or usable in any suit
or action for damages growing out of the accident." Finally, a
provision of the Act which has never been used to date allowed
appointment of a special Board of Inquiry, including two mem-
bers appointed by the President, to investigate accidents involving
"substantial questions of public safety in air transportation.""
The ink on the FAA Act was hardly dry when the CAB was
forced to request the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Agency to investigate certain aircraft accidents for a temporary
period." The limited size and resources of the CAB (less than
150 people) made this step necessary, a paradoxical action in
view of the arguments which had taken place six months earlier
over which agency should handle investigations. Essentially, the
CAB was to conduct the field investigations of all air carrier acci-
dents and of all fatal general aviation cases. The Board retained
its right to "take back" any of the accidents it had "delegated"
should public interest so dictate. The CAB firmly maintained its
role in determining the probable cause of all accidents and in
specifying the form by which the FAA would submit its factual
findings. With some slight modifications, this procedure has con-
tinued to this date.'
Subsequent to the enactment of the Act, the public and the
media were confused over which agency had what functions. Ad-
ministrators of the FAA would sometimes preempt the Board in
publicly announcing the probable causes of accidents. The Board
was also criticized on occasion for pressuring manufacturers to
make service changes.' These problems have never disappeared
completely. However, the roles of the FAA and the investigating
body of the CAB did stabilize as time passed.
The Department of Transportation Act of 1966
The next major event related to civil aviation accident investi-
2Id. S 701(g).
I Id. 5 701(e).
31 Id. § 703.
3CAB Pub. Notice PN-13 (1958).
'See 42 Fed. Reg. 8379 (1977).
11 108 Cong. Rec. 12,877-78 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Magnuson).
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gation was the passage of the Department of Transportation
(DOT) Act of 1966.' It required all of President Johnson's legis-
lative acumen to push the Act through Congress. Formal signing
of the bill took place on October 15, 1966, and the Department's
existence became official on April 1, 1967.' The investigation of
aviation accidents, however, continued to encounter problems.
Alan Boyd's"' planning task force shifted the CAB's BOS into the
new DOT. Through the efforts of Senators Monroney and Magnu-
son, however, the BOS was transformed into the Bureau of Avia-
tion Safety (BAS) under the newly-formed National Transporta-
tion Safety Board (NTSB or Board).
Originally, the NTSB was intended to be a quasi-judicial group
to determine the various causes of accidents and to hear appeals
in certificate and penalty cases. It was to depend entirely on the
existing administrative agencies for the needed investigative find-
ings. As it turned out, personnel from the BAS comprised the over-
whelming majority of the staff assigned to the NTSB for several
years, and BAS procedures and those of the CAB began to spill
over into other areas.
From its inception, the NTSB was composed of five presi-
dential appointees whose rule-making authority regarding aviation
accident investigation followed the investigative provisions of the
FAA Act which were essentially unchanged after the formation
of the DOT. The Bureau of Aviation Safety under the NTSB con-
tinued to function much as it had under the CAB.
The investigative task of the NTSB soon became a formidible
one. The wide-body jets were introduced in late 1969, producing
still another dimension in the complexity of investigations. The
growth of aviation had continued, and in 1969 the airman popula-
tion reached 989,803, 720,000 of whom were considered "ac-
tive." The number of certificated aircraft grew to 190,749, in-
cluding approximately 3,000 air transports. The number of air-
ports had grown to 11,050. Sixty-four air carrier accidents oc-
curred in 1969, ten of which were fatal, resulting in 158 deaths.
IDepartment of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat.
931 (1966).
P. Kent, Safe, Separated and Soaring, 9 History of Federal Aviation Civil
Aviation Policy, 1961-1972 (unpublished report prepared for the FAA).
"TAlan Boyd later was to become the first Secretary of Transportation.
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General aviation experienced 4,767 accidents and the deaths of
1,495 people." The air taxi business began to be a major identi-
fiable segment of general aviation. Large numbers of multi-engine
aircraft and jet aircraft also had found their way into the "light
plane" market.
The Independent Safety Board Act of 1974
Consumerism struck the aviation field in the early 1970's. Strong
public reaction, enhanced by media coverage, followed each air
tragedy. Products liability litigation forced general aviation manu-
facturers to assume participatory roles in NTSB investigations,
roles previously experienced only by the FAA, airlines and air
carrier aircraft manufacturers. In addition, a political scenario
affecting air safety developed. First, the NTSB's Executive Direc-
tor was replaced in 1971 by a person of minimal government and
executive experience associated with the Nixon White House staff.
Subsequently, a severe conflict developed between this new "Gen-
eral Manager" and the then civil service Director of the Bureau of
Aviation Safety.' This conflict related to the quality and timeli-
ness of NTSB reports and to the role of the Director vis-a-vis the
General Manager in technical matters regarding the investigation
process. The General Manager demanded improvements in "pro-
ductivity," in the form of shortened times for the submission of
reports, in accordance with White House directives. The Director
opposed these impractical requirements based upon his concern
for a critical problem with the quality of reports and with the
continuing legislative and Safety Board mandate to determine
probable cause in all aviation accidents. Additionally, the Direc-
tor's requests which asked for additional resources or authority to
select only certain accidents for investigation were denied.
Along with this and other internal problems, increasing friction
was developing among the FAA, DOT and the NTSB concerning
NTSB recommendations and FAA responses. While this develop-
ment had received some attention from Congressional committees,
the Paris DC-10 accident on March 3, 1974, caused concern to
focus on this issue and on the issue of undue influence by the
38 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
9 M. JOHNSTON, THE LAST NINE MINUTES (1976).
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executive branch on the supposedly independent NTSB.' Further,
NTSB functions were being interfered with by DOT administrative
personnel, and the Board had begun to appear to lack independ-
ence in the eyes of the public.
The result of these conflicts was the Independent Safety Board
Act of 1974' which was formally implemented on April 1, 1975.
The Act stated that the Safety Board could not be expected to per-
form its investigative and oversight functions "unless it is totally
separate and independent from any other department . . . of the
United States."' The Act continued and refined the Board's author-
ity which had been derived from the DOT and FAA Acts. It also
broadened the Board's investigative authority in other areas of
transportation,' defined procedures for responses to NTSB recom-
mendations," and required that no less than two members of the
Board be persons who have been appointed in the field of acci-
dent reconstruction, safety engineering, or transportation safety.'
One significant result of the Act, besides enlarging the NTSB
function in other areas, was a major reorganization of the Board
in 1976. The Bureau of Aviation Safety as it had existed since
1938 disappeared. That Bureau and the Bureau of Surface Trans-
portation Safety were replaced by separate organizations related
to Accident Investigation, Technology, Plans and Programs and
Administration. The Plans and Programs Bureau has since been
abolished. An Aviation Accident Division is now the highest rank-
ing division devoted exclusively to aviation. '
While the Independent Safety Board Act was the latest of the
major legislative efforts, directly affecting aviation accident investi-
gation, several other acts also merit special attention. They in-
' P. EDDY, E. POTTER & B. PAGE, DESTINATION DISASTER 142 (1976); SEN.
COMM. ON COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE OVERSIGHT HEARINGS & INVESTIGATION
OF THE DC-10 AIRCRAFT, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. (1974).






' This division is headed by a GS-15, whereas the previous senior aviation
level was a GS-18. "GS" refers to Career Civil Service General Schedule ratings,
of which 18 is the highest designation.
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fluenced the scope of the investigative process and detailed the
procedures to be followed by the investigative bodies.
Federal Tort Claims Act
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),"' passed in 1946,
the Federal Government became liable for claims "for money
only.... on account of damage to or loss of property or on ac-
count of personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrong-
ful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment. . . ."' Certain
exceptions were provided, however, such as the discretionary func-
tion exception:
The provisions of this title shall not apply to: (a) Any claim
based upon an Act or omission of an employee of the Govern-
ment, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regula-
tion, whether or not that statute be valid, or based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a Federal agency
or employee of the government, whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.
Since the FAA performs operational tasks within the aviation
system and regulates that system, the FTCA opened a new avenue
for litigation. For example, causes of action have been based upon
the negligent operation of the air traffic control system. Suits also
have been brought for damages caused by CAB/FAA personnel
operating government aircraft.49 In recent years even the discre-
tionary function exception to liability has been challenged in one
major aviation case, Clemente v. United States." In that case,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the district court's
judgment for the plaintiff which had been based upon alleged
negligence in the FAA's inspection function. The trend, however,
is expected to be contrary to that opinion, with increased govern-
mental liability rather than total protection under the discretionary
function exception."1
" Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946).
4 Id. § 410(a).
' United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964).
" Clemente v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 1 (D.P.R. 1977).
"I K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 209 (6th ed. 1977).
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Freedom of Information Act
The first of four "open government" acts, the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA)"a has recently had an impact on the Safety
Board's investigation procedures. The FOIA was passed in 1966
and was reinforced by amendments in 1974 which imposed time
limits for responses and threatened disciplinary action against its
violators. The FOIA has increased the public availability of NTSB
and FAA records.
The key paragraphs of the FOIA relate to the nature of the
material which is to be made available for inspection and copy-
ing; the procedures to be followed in that activity, to be promul-
gated by the agency; and steps to be taken in the federal courts if
the information is not made available after such procedures are
followed." The Act details certain information which is excepted
from its provisions, including information regarding internal prac-
tices of agencies, "privileged or confidential" trade secrets, and
"interagency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litiga-
tion with the agency."" These exceptions have become the subject
of dispute in aviation accident investigations.
Federal Advisory Committee Act
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)k is the second
of the four "open government" Acts. Its impact on aviation accident
investigation has been minimal as the Safety Board has elected not
to form any committees under its provisions. Beginning in the early
1970's, informal suggestions were made regarding the institution of
a NTSB-Aviation Advisory Committee to provide communication
with the Safety Board concerning aviation accident investigation
procedures and problems. However, the administrative workload
demand under the FACA (agenda lead-times, publishing of pro-
ceedings, etc.) was deemed by the Board to be excessive in com-
parison to the potential benefits. The Board instead held meetings
- 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
53Id. § 552(a) (2), (3).
"Id. S 552(a)(3)-(6).
-Id. § 552(b).
' Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat.
770 (1972).
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with aviation groups, allowed staff participation in seminars, and
authorized the BAS to conduct one major meeting in 1975 to
exchange aviation investigation ideas with industry.'
Privacy Act
The main provision of the Privacy Act forbids disclosure of
information about an individual to any person without that indi-
vidual's consent, except in accordance with one of eleven clauses
of the Act. The second of these clauses allows disclosure of in-
formation due to requests under the FOIA, thus suggesting that
personal data found in accident records could be revealed without
the consent of the individual in question unless one of the FOIA
exceptions was applicable." This interpretation is relatively aca-
demic when considering NTSB reports of aviation accident investi-
gations. The NTSB does not code or otherwise classify accident
information by the name of individuals. Parties involved in an
accident are identified in the body of a report and the report
dockets are available upon request. However, unlike criminal or
regulatory violation files, NTSB material is not classified as to the
people involved in the accident. Questions under the Privacy Act
have not yet been raised at the NTSB in connection with accident
investigation." The two areas in which questions could arise are:
(1) those involving airmen's records or comments related thereto
which are analyzed and made part of the NTSB docket, and (2)
those involving transcripts of cockpit voice recordings made in
accordance with administrative rules developed well before the
passage of the Privacy Act in 1974.
Government in the Sunshine Act
The 1976 Government in the Sunshine Act (GSA)" was en-
acted to provide public 'Visibility to the proceedings of quasi-
judicial bodies such as the NTSB. The effect of this Act has been
to open Safety Board meetings at which accident reports are dis-
57 Report of the Bureau of Aviation Safety/Industry Meeting, Aircraft Acci-
dent Investigation in Downington, Pa. (September 29, October 2, 1975) [herein-
after cited as Report of the Bureau].
"Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
59 Id. at § 552a(b).
"Interview with Fritz L. Puls, General Counsel of the NTSB (March 21,
1979).
" Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).
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cussed. However, the media, parties and others interested in par-
ticular cases may simply observe; they are not allowed to partici-
pate. Agendas and transcripts of the meetings are published, pro-
viding a record heretofore unavailable to the public. As a practical
matter, numerous meetings between the staff and the chairman or
individual board members precede the public session. Further, in
a large majority of the cases, the final acceptance of the Board
reports ultimately occurs in the members' offices.
The "open meeting" provisions of the GSA apply only to those
sessions where there will be "deliberations of at least the number
of individual agency members required to take action on behalf
of the agency. . . ."" In addition wide discretion is given to the
members of the agency to limit the information which will be in-
cluded on the agenda for discussion at the public meeting. For
example, under the "practices of an agency" exception of the Act,
it would be possible for the Board to preclude or limit discussion
of the adequacy of its investigative procedures as illustrated by a
particular case."3 Such a situation has been witnessed by this
author, although it was not clear whether the limited discussion
was the function of a decision of the Board or simply the result
of unwillingness of the staff to present all issues to the Board."4
Airline Deregulation Act
Ostensibly, the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA)," the most
recent piece of significant aviation legislation, would seem to have
little direct bearing on accident investigation beyond strengthening
the need for such investigations. The CAB is directed to maintain
safety "as the highest priority in air commerce '' " and to recog-
nize "the clear intent, encouragement, and dedication of the Con-
gress to the furtherance of the highest degree of safety in air trans-
portation .. .which has come to be expected by the traveling
63Id. § 552b(a) (2).
3Id. § 552b(c)(2).
64The NTSB met August 17 and September 11, 1978, in response to a peti-
tion of the Allied Pilots Association re American Airlines B727 accident at
St. Thomas, V.I., April 27, 1976.
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1584 (Supp. II 1980), as




and shipping public." ' Implicit in the new Act, however, is an
anticipated proliferation of carrier operations to new terminals,
along with a marked increase in commuter and air taxi operations.
Because of this expansion of operations and the continued concern
for safety, more pressure will be applied to the NTSB to investi-
gate all accidents and incidents occurring in such operations. Thus
more aircraft operators need to become familiar with aviation
accident procedures and technology lest their rights be compro-
mised by their own ignorance.
Aviation Safety Status Today
Preliminary figures for 1978 indicate that the number of cer-
tificated airmen now exceeds three quarters of a million. There are
approximately 2,500 air carrier transports in use and nearly
200,000 general aviation aircraft. Airports number close to 15,000.
Air carriers in that year experienced twenty-five major accidents,
which killed a total of 163 persons. General aviation suffered
4,609 accidents (795 fatal accidents), resulting in 1,690 fatalities."8
The potential for accidents is increasing constantly. There has been,
however, a stabilization of some of the statistical indices, a tribute
to the aviation system.
Nevertheless, the risk and exposure of aviation accidents is
measured by more factors than the mere number of events. Such
factors include the size and complexity of the vehicles involved
and fatality density. Due to the increase in aircraft size, the num-
ber of fatalities occurring in any given event rose dramatically
in the 1970's." Hence, while the overall number of accidents is
not startling compared to the figures of ten or twenty years ago,
the number of people that potentially can be killed at one time
and at one place is staggering. Moreover, aircraft are now being
developed which have the capacity of carrying over 650 persons.
To be sure, neither aviation nor legislation have ceased to be
" id. S 1302(a) (2).
68 See note 5 supra.
On September 4, 1971, 111 people were killed in the largest single plane loss
ever experienced by a U.S. carrier to that time; on March 3, 1974, 346 people
were killed in the Paris DC-10 crash; on March 27, 1977, 573 people were killed
in a ground collision of two B-747's in Tenerife; on September 25, 1978, 144
people were killed in San Diego, setting a new American record for single plane
and mid-air collision loss; on May 25, 1979, 273 people were killed in the
Chicago DC-10 crash.
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dynamic. The only question is: "Which crash or crashes will trigger
the next furor?" Indeed, such furor is probably going on at this
time.
CURRENT RULES AND PROCEDURES
REGARDING CIVIL AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION
Rules Adopted by the National Transportation Safety Board
Pursuant to authority granted to the CAB in Title VII of the
FAA Act of 1958, * and transferred to the NTSB in the DOT
Act of 1966"' and in the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974,'
the following rules pertaining to civil aircraft accident investiga-
tion have been promulgated."3
PART 800-Organization and Functions of the Board and Delega-
tions of Authority
This rule discusses the organizational structure of the National
Transportation Safety Board and describes the Board's primary
function as "the promotion of safety in transportation" and its
primary responsibility to "the investigation, determination of facts,
conditions and circumstances and the cause or probable cause of
... all accidents involving civil aircraft."' The Bureau of Accident
Investigation conducts the investigations, recommends that public
hearings and depositions be held, and prepares public reports for
submission to the Board which include a determination of the
probable cause of each accident. The Bureau participates in for-
eign accident investigations pursuant to Annex 13 of the Chicago
Convention.' The Bureau also proposes safety recommendations
in an attempt to prevent future accidents. The Bureau of Tech-
nology provides technical and analytical services to the Bureau
of Accident Investigation and other entities.
Support for the basic investigative task is provided by the
Office of General Counsel, the Office of Public Affairs, and the
70Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 782 (1958).
71 Pub. L. No. 89-70, 80 Stat. 931 (1966).
72 Pub. L. No. 93-633, 88 Stat. 2156 (1974).
7349 C.F.R. §§ 800-850.35 (1979).
4 1d. § 800.3 (1979).
73 ICAO, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, ACCIDENT




Bureau of Administration. The Office of the Managing Director,
which assists the Chairman in his role as executive and adminis-
trative head of the Board, coordinates and directs the activities
of the entire staff." Another support organ, although not directly
related to accident investigation, is the Office of Administrative
Law Judges. This Office conducts all formal proceedings which
arise under Title VI of the FAA Act of 1958 involving the sus-
pension, revocation or petitions for reissuance of airman's cer-
tificates.
Certain delegations of authority by the Board are also contained
in Section 800. For example, the Managing Director makes the
final determination regarding the withholding of material from
public copying. In addition, he appoints and supervises the Board
personnel." The General Counsel approves testimony by Board
personnel and supplies editorial input for Board reports."8 The
Director of the Bureau of Accident Investigation has the authority
to initiate investigations and to disclose factual information dis-
covered in those investigations." Board investigative employees *
have the authority to sign and issue subpoenas, to administer oaths
and to take depositions.
An Appendix to Part 800 contains the current request to the
Secretary of Transportation for assistance which "delegates" the
fact-finding authority in certain aircraft accidents to the FAA."
This authority extends to all accidents which involve rotorcraft,
aerial application aircraft, amateur-built aircraft and restricted
category aircraft, and fixed-wing aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds,
except where rotorcraft and "under twelve five" accidents involve
fatalities. The NTSB has retained investigative authority over acci-
dents involving all Part 135 (Air Taxi) operations, all air carrier
accidents, and all mid-air collisions. Provisions in this section also
allow the NTSB to retain authority over certain other cases and
permit it to ask the FAA to investigate certain accidents not other-
wise delegated to the FAA."
-649 C.F.R. § 800.22 (1979).
77 Id.
78 Id. § 800.24.
79 Id. § 800.25.
-o Id. § 800.27.
"142 Fed. Reg. 8379 (1977).
n Id.
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PART 801-Public Availability of Information
Citing the Freedom of Information Act 3 and the NTSB's en-
abling legislation," this rule details the policy, administration, time
limits, records and exemptions applicable to public requests for
information. Many of the provisions are pertinent to aviation
accident investigation. The rule delineates the policy of making
"information available to the greatest extent possible." It man-
dates the existence of a "Public Inquiries Section" and a "public
reference room to aid review of docket and recommendation
material." It states that factual documents assembled during an
investigation normally are available for sixty days after an acci-
dent. The determination of probable cause normally is made within
six months after the accident. Also discussed are the Quarterly
Index of the Board's opinions and orders in safety enforcement
cases and the administrative staff manuals which affect the public,
neither of which are exempted under the Freedom of Information
Act.' Requests for records should be made under Freedom of In-
formation Act procedures as outlined in the rule. Failure to follow
proper procedures will only delay response. The Safety Board pos-
sesses an excellent reputation for servicing requests from the public
promptly. Difficulties usually occur because individuals do not un-
derstand or respect the Board's procedures.
PART 802-Rules Implementing the Privacy Act of 1974
This rule merely amplifies the Privacy Act. It has not been
exercised up to this date with regard to aviation accident investi-
gation records. Requests for information should be made in writ-
ing to the Director of the Bureau of Administration, or in person
to the office where the records are located. A "System Manager"
makes the initial decision regarding the availability of the records
and responds to the individual making the request." Subsequent
procedures for review or appeal also are detailed in this rule.
" 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended by Pub. L No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561-64 (1974).
"Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1907, 88 Stat.
2166 (1974).
5 U.S.C. S 552, as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561-64 (1974).
49 C.F.R. §§ 802.7, 802.8 (1979).
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PART 804-Rules Implementing the Government
in the Sunshine Act
This rule applies to "deliberations of three or more Members
which such deliberations determine or result in the joint conduct
or disposition of official NTSB business. . . ." It does not include
meetings related to "notation voting or similar consideration of
business . . ." or to the releasing or withholding of information.
The public is invited to attend open meetings, but may not par-
ticipate; the NTSB also will make available transcripts of the non-
exempt portions of meetings."
Announcements of the meetings appear in the Federal Register
and are displayed prominently on the premises occupied by the
NTSB at least one week before each meeting. Extensive proced-
ures are involved to document the reasons for conducting closed
meetings. The permissible reasons for holding closed meetings
parallel those stated in the Privacy Act. Considerable discretion
remains regarding which subjects wili be reviewed. For example,
a "meeting may be closed and information pertinent to such a
meeting . . . may be withheld if the Board properly determines
that such a meeting . . . is likely to ... disclose information the
premature disclosure of which would be likely to significantly
frustrate implementation of a proposed action of the NTSB .... ""
Despite these limitations, the rationale behind certain accident
investigation findings is now more visible to the public than prior
to the passage of the Government in the Sunshine Act.
PART 805-Employee Responsibilities and Conduct
One problem area frequently encountered in aviation accident
investigations is the real or imagined preferential treatment given
by the NTSB investigators to one of the parties to the investigation.
The Board's policy regarding this matter is firmly stated in this
rule:
Members and employees shall avoid any action, whether or not
specifically prohibited by the regulations in this part (805), which
might result in or create the appearance of: ... (2) Giving prefer-
ential treatment to any person" . . . (4) Losing complete inde-
87 Id. 804.10
88 Id. $ 804.5.
11 "Person" means an individual, a corporation, an association, a firm or any
other organization or institution. 49 C.F.R. § 805.735-2 (1979).
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pendence or partiality... (6) Affecting adversely the confidence
of the public in the integrity of the government."
Similar provisions apply to investigations and to disciplinary and
remedial actions."' Hence, should any person believe that im-
proper or unethical conduct has occurred in the course of an acci-
dent investigation, a mechanism is available to adjudicate his
claims.
PART 821-Rules and Practices in Air Safety Proceedings
The title of this rule is misleading unless one remembers the
time when "air safety proceedings" referred to the enforcement
of violations of the rules. Tradition apparently has prevailed,
carrying this terminology forward, although the proceedings today
involve only those appeals related to certificate actions. They do
not relate in any fashion to accident investigations of the NTSB.
It is worthwhile to note that the only rule pertaining to evidence
in these proceedings is as follows:
Every party shall have the right to present his case or defense by
oral or documentary evidence, to submit evidence in rebuttal, and
to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full
and true disclosure of the facts."
This approach is virtually identical to that of the Administrative
Procedures Act. 3 Thus it can be concluded that considerable lati-
tude is available to the administrative law judge in the conduct
of the hearing.
PART 830-Rules Pertaining to the Notification and the Reporting
of Aircraft Accidents or Incidents and Overdue Air-
craft, and Preservation of Aircraft Wreckage, Mail,
Cargo and Records.
Successful accident/incident investigation requires prompt noti-
fication of the mishap to the appropriate authorities and the
preservation of wreckage and relevant evidence. Part 830 applies
to these concerns. It provides definitions of "aircraft accident,"
"incident," "fatal injury," "substantial damage," and "aircraft
"I d. § 805-3(c).
"Id. § 805.735.27.
93 Sd. § 821.38.
e5 U.S.C. § 556 (Supp. 1980).
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operator," and places limits upon what information must be re-
ported and by whom it must be reported. The rule requires
initial notification should be made as expeditiously as possible to
any of the NTSB field offices. It states that the responsibility of
the operator is to preserve wreckage, mail, cargo and records,
subject to the overriding priority to protect persons from further
injury."
As a practical matter, notification of aviation accidents most
often is made through FAA sources, such as air traffic control
facilities. Public sources, such as the local police and media, also
provide early notification. The obligation always rests upon the
operator, however, to follow the steps noted above.
PARTS 831 AND 845-Aircraft Accident/Incident Investigation
Procedures and Rules of Practice in Aircraft Acci-
dent/Incident Investigations
An offshoot of Part 830, these two rules relate to the procedural
practices followed by the NTSB. These practices have existed rela-
tively unchanged for decades and are well-known to investigating
authorities. They are the ones most frequently encountered by
attorneys. Part 831 denies the status of "party to the field investi-
gation" to persons representing claimants and insurers.' Such per-
sons are distinguished from "those persons, Government agencies,
companies and associations whose employees, functions, activities
or products were involved in the accident and who can provide
suitably qualified personnel who will actively assist in the field
investigation."" The rule contains a provision for requesting that
information acquired in the course of the investigation be withheld
from public disclosure." The right of any person interrogated by
NTSB personnel to be "accompanied, represented, or advised by
counsel or by any other duly qualified representative is also
affirmed," and the duties and authority of the NTSB Investigator-
in-Charge (ICC) are outlined."
-49 C.F.R. S 830.10 (1979).
-Id. S 831.9.
"eId.
7 Id. § 831.5.
- Id. 5 831.6.
-Id. § 831.7.
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Practices followed in conducting a public hearing are discussed
in Part 845. These include the designation of parties to the hear-
ing and the procedures for examining witnesses and introducing
evidence."' The required form and content of the Board's accident
reports are delineated. Such reports are to include "a detailed
narrative accident report in connection with the investigation into
those aircraft accidents which the Board determines to warrant
such a report."'"' This is the so-called "blue cover report." Further,
"the probable cause and facts, conditions, and circumstances of
all other accidents""' are to be reported in a manner and form pre-
scribed by the Board.' 3 Procedures for requesting the reconsidera-
tion or modification of Board reports are discussed. These requests
will be entertained only if they are based upon the discovery of
new evidence or upon a showing that the Board's findings, as to
the facts, conditions and circumstances surrounding an accident
are erroneous."' A public docket is to be available which will in-
clude all factual information concerning the accident including
any recommendations submitted by interested persons and requests
for reconsideration and modification."
PART 835-Testimony of Board Employees
This NTSB rule has undergone a recent change in light of
both the new statutory base of the NTSB under the Act of 1974
and recent court decisions. It "prescribes the policies and pro-
cedures' regarding the testimony of employees of the . . . Board
in suits or actions for damages and criminal proceedings arising
out of transportation accidents.""' It defines the Board's reports
and restricts their use by employees "as a testimonial aid . . . to
refresh [the witness'] memory.""' The rule deals with the scope
of permissible testimony, but does not address the subject of opin-
ion or expert testimony. The manner in which testimony is to be
given is discussed, limited under this rule to depositions and re-
00 Id. §§ 845.13, 845.25, 845.26.






"'Id. 55 835.1, 835.7.
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sponses to interrogatories. Employee testimony must be requested
through the Board's Office of General Counsel."8 Testimony of
former Board employees may relate only to cases investigated by
the person when he or she was employed by the NTSB"'
What is not apparent from the above summary or from a full
reading of Part 835 is the significant change that occurred when
this rule was altered on July 17, 1975. While the manner and
procedure for requesting and receiving testimony remained the
same, the scope of permissible testimony and the allowable use of
Board documentation for that testimony was modified substan-
tially. As stated in the notification of the new rule in the Federal
Register:
The only opinions of investigators proscribed now are those which
reflect the ultimate determination of cause or probable cause de-
termined by the Board and expressed in the Board's reports. The
Board considers its revised policy to be consistent with the exist-
ing law, relying in particular on Kline v. Martin,". . . . .The
Board continues its prohibition against the requirement that in-
vestigators should testify on matters beyond the scope of their
investigation."'
Kline v. Martin involved a motion to compel testimony from NTSB
and FAA investigators during the discovery stage of a case. The
court's memorandum and order stated: "The witnesses should be
allowed to testify even if it involves their opinions, so long as the
opinion is not as to the ultimate conclusion of cause of the acci-
dent."'' . The Board has clearly taken exception to another case, Falk
v. United States,"' in which an investigator was required to express
an opinion as to the cause of an accident. The Board cited the
repeal of Section 5 of the DOT Act of 1966 and the enactment
of the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, particularly Section
304(b) (10) (c), which reaffirms the proscription against the use of
a "report of the Board" as evidence in litigation.
Use of investigators' factual reports is now permissible since
108 d. §§ 835.6, 835.7.
" Id. § 835.7.
110345 F. Supp. 31 (D.C. Ca. 1972).
"140 Fed. Reg. 30,254 (1975).
11 Kline v. Markin, 345 F. Supp. 31, 33 (D.C. Va. 1972).
11353 F.R.D. 113 (D.C. Conn. 1971).
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these are no longer deemed reports of the Board. These factual
reports include the information contained in NTSB Forms
6120.1/.2 and 6120.411 and the results of the group chairmen's
investigations which lead to "blue cover" reports. Indeed, accord-
ing to the NTSB the only reports not presently available for use
in litigation are the "blue cover" reports and computer briefs,
both of which reflect the Board's determination of probable cause.
NTSB Internal Practices Regarding Accident Investigation
Like any Federal agency, the NTSB refines its statutory author-
ity with internal standard operating procedures, instructional
manuals, reference documents, and publications and presentations
by key officials. These sources of information are rarely known
or appreciated by any persons other than those who work directly
in the field on a continuous basis. These internal practices govern
the day-to-day investigative and support processes of the Board,
and some familiarity with them is essential to a thorough knowl-
edge of aviation accident investigation.
One principal document which required several years of prepa-
ration is the "Inquiry Manual: Aircraft Accidents and Inci-
dents,"'11 issued most recently on February 10, 1975. The Table
of Contents, summarized as follows, provides insight into the scope
of the manual:
Section I Federal Authorities and Responsibilities
II Preinvestigation Preparedness
III Notification of Accidents/Incidents and Initial Re-
sponse
IV Field Investigation Procedures
V Reports of Investigation Phase of Inquiry
VI Public Hearings and Depositions
VII Preparation of Final Report of Inquiry
VIII Accident Prevention Actions
IX Alerts, Bulletins and Notices.1 .
X Appendices
114NTSB Order No. 6120.1/.2 is the Operator's Report (general aviation/air
carrier). NTSB Order No. 6120.4 is the Factual Aircraft Accident Report.
11 NTSB Order No. 6200.1, Inquiry Manuals: Aircraft Accident and Inci-
dents (1975).
" Item IX pertains to investigation matters as distinguished from alert bullet-
ins, or other similar bulletins which might be released by the FAA or a manu-
facturer.
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The manual includes information regarding the organization and
procedures for "go-teams," the division of notification and com-
munications responsibilities, the procedures to be followed at the
scene of the accident, and the investigation techniques and guide-
lines applicable to certain segments of the inquiry, such as systems,
power plants and human factors. Procedures to be followed in the
public hearings are detailed, and instructions on completing acci-
dent reports, including the submission of recommendations, are
given.
Separate documents are promulgated periodically and these
eventually may appear in the manuals. Some of the more useful
documents include one entitled "Goals for Accident Investigation,"
an expression of NTSB policy, and another headed "Information
for the Guidance of the Parties to the Investigation of Aircraft
Accidents," a document distributed to the parties at the scene of
a major accident by the Investigator-in-Charge. In addition, there
are available other useful documents such as the "Opening State-
ment of Investigator-in-Charge at Organizational Meeting," the
"Opening Statement at the Prehearing Conference," and th
"Opening Statement at the Hearing." These documents contain a
plethora of regulatory and procedural material for groups who
are not familiar with the practices of the NTSB.
Knowledge of NTSB internal practices is essential to attorneys
and to other individuals who may have an interest in air safety
investigation. Not interfering with the NTSB's principal mission
is the key to acquiring its cooperation and assistance. Experienced
aviation litigation attorneys usually encounter the fewest difficul-
ties because of their familiarity with Board procedures and their
appreciation of the Board's role.
Two other internal NTSB documents also are worth mentioning:
the "Manual of Code Classifications, Aircraft Accidents and Inci-
dents,"'' . and the "Analyst's Handbook . . . Guide for Using the
Manual for Code Classifications.""... The former publication out-
lines the classification scheme used by the NTSB to categorize,
store and retrieve accident data. Computers are used to sort, ana-
"17NTSB, MANUAL OF CODE CLASSIFICATIONS, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS AND
INCIDENTS (3d ed. June, 1970) (with revisions).
118 BUREAU OF Av. SAFETY, SAFETY ANALYSIS Div., ANALYST'S HANDBOOK,
PART II, GUIDE FOR USING THE MANUAL OF CODE CLASSIFICATIONS (Jan. 1973).
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lyze and print out this data. The latter document provides internal
rules for coding a report for computerized storage and later re-
trieval. The data system employed by the NTSB is quite import-
ant; its product, the computer "brief," is the only "report" pro-
duced by the Safety Board in all of the approximately 4,000 cases it
handles each year. Thus, assessment of probable cause is depend-
ent upon the language selected to be compatible with the com-
puterized system.
Totally absent from the publications regarding NTSB pro-
cedures and practices is any document outlining the roles individual
Board members play in the investigation process, including the
roles they play in determining probable cause. Traditionally, this
has remained the prerogative of the individual member despite
the fact that this has caused confusion to persons both inside and
outside the NTSB.
FAA Internal Practices Regarding Accident Investigation
The FAA's authority in accident investigations has been well
documented since passage of the FAA Act of 1958.11 The au-
thority within the provision of that Act has been supplemented
by a comprehensive manual, "Aircraft Accident and Incident
Notification, Investigation and Reporting."'" Besides providing
guidelines and detailed procedures for investigations, the manual
clearly reveals the function of each major organizational segment
of the system and the exact function of many individual employees
who would be expected to participate in an investigation. For
example, the duties of the Office of General Counsel are described
as follows:
The provisions of legal representation, counsel, and advice to the
Office of the Administrator and other FAA offices and services,
where required in connection with accident investigations, is a
primary function of the Office and should be given a high priority
at all times. 1
A distinction is drawn for "investigations requiring full legal
participation," those involving fatal air carrier mishaps, mid-air
Ito See Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §5 1301, 1441 (Supp. II 1980).
120FAA Order No. 8020.11, Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification, In-
vestigation and Reporting (July 16, 1979).
121 Id. Ch. 4, par. 124.
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collisions, accidents in which governmental liability is possible,
and incidents with high public interest. Fourteen specific tasks
are then outlined which clearly go beyond any objective of air
safety investigation and which relate to the normal duty of any
attorney to protect his client's interest.
The identification of FAA practices in aircraft accident investi-
gation also can be derived from the textbook used at the DOT
Transportation Safety Institute at the FAA Aeronautical Center
in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma."" This school was originally a
joint CAB/NTSB-FAA operation; hence, the investigative tech-
nology utilized there closely parallels that implemented in the
NTSB investigations.
International Considerations
Standards and recommended practices for aircraft accident in-
quiries were first adopted by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) in April, 1951, pursuant to Article 37 of
the Convention on International Aviation which had taken place
in Chicago in 1944. These standards were designated Annex 13
to the Convention." Five major amendments have been accepted
since 1951, the most recent one resulting from the 1974 Accident
Investigation and Prevention Divisional Meeting in Montreal.""
United States procedures and practices have dominated the de-
velopment of Annex 13 throughout the years. This is reflected in
the ICAO's "Manual of Aircraft Investigation," a magnificent
effort at the time of its original publication and still an excellent
reference document for aircraft accident investigation."
Both Annex 13 and the Manual are explicit in citing the objec-
tive of an investigation-the prevention of accidents and incidents,
not the determination of blame. Specifically, Annex 13 states:
"The fundamental objective of the investigation of an accident or
incident shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents. It is
2 DOT TRANSPORTATION SAFETY INSTITUTE, AmCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTI-
GATION PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES (5th ed. 1976).
2 ICAO, STANDARDS AND PRACTICES, supra note 75.
12 ICAO, Doc. No. 9106, Report of the Accident Investigation and Prevention
Divisional Meeting, June 3-24, 1974 [hereinafter cited as ICAO, Report of
Meeting].
n5 ICAO, Doc. No. 6920-AN/855/4, Manual of Aircraft Accident Investiga-
tion (4th ed. 1970).
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not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability."
The Manual states:
The nature of the inquiry into an aircraft accident should not be
accusatory as the object is to take remedial rather than punitive
action; similarly the assessment of blame or responsibility should
not be included in the duties of the accident investigation authority
since this function is normally the prerogative of the judicial
authorities of the State concerned. '"
Unfortunately, international accident investigation efforts have
only recently begun to face the procedural problems inherent when
civil litigation and air safety objectives clash."' Several key law-
safety subjects were discussed at the September 1979 meeting of
the ICAO Accident Prevention and Investigation Division in
Montreal. These included: balancing the emphasis on accident
prevention vis-a-vis investigative fact-finding; strengthening the
role of the Investigator-in-Charge when he is "exposed to any
influence which may jeopardize the objectivity and completeness
of the investigation"; resolving conflicts between states' Freedom
of Information laws and the ICAO's desire to communicate all
accident investigation information freely; and defining the role of
the operator's State of citizenship, not always the State of registry
or manufacture of the aircraft.
Thus, the international authorities are just beginning to resolve
the informational problem faced by the United States in the last
decade and other problems which were resolved here long ago.
PROBABLE CAUSE IN ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND IN THE LAW
The Cause Dichotomy
Causation is a central concern in accident investigation. It is
also central to the task of a jury in the context of a trial. The
facts from which causal determinations are made are identical,
whether they are analyzed by a safety board during an accident
investigation or by a jury at trial. Realistically, however, the
factual demands of a safety-oriented investigation are usually not
equal in scope or depth to those of a trial court. More often than
not, the investigations conducted for purposes of litigation go be-
'" See ICAO, STANDARDS AND PRACTICES, supra note 75, S 3.1.
n2 See ICAO Report of Meeting, supra note 124, at I-1-1.
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yond those conducted by safety organizations. Although it is im-
portant in both contexts to determine the cause of the event in
question, the safety-oriented investigation is often concerned with
causation only as it leads to the development of recommendations
for the prevention of similar accidents. The jury is concerned with
causation as it is defined by the law in terms of legal cause or
proximate cause to determine which party was legally at fault.
Unfortunately, those who speak in terms of air safety and those
who speak in legal terms do not always use the same language.
Thus "probable cause" and "cause" as used in the context of acci-
dent investigations do not have the same meaning as "probable
cause" or "proximate cause" have in the legal context.
Causal determination made its way into the legislative history
of aviation acts as early as 1926.18 "Probable cause" first appeared
in the 1934 amendment to the Air Commerce Act of 1926:
At the conclusion of an investigation of or at a hearing on any
such accident or as soon thereafter as circumstances permit, the
Secretary of Commerce shall, if he deems it in the public interest,
make public a statement of the probable cause or causes of the
accident. . . . (emphasis added) 1 '
Similarly, the procedural manual developed within the Bureau of
Air Commerce to implement the amendment stated: "The Final
[Accident] Report should conclude with the statement as to the
probable cause or causes of the accident .... ."
The principal author of this procedural manual was Professor
W. H. Wigmore, the renowned evidence scholar. Professor Wig-
more's definition of causation in the context of accident investiga-
128 Clearly causation has a significant role in accident investigation whether
the general objective is social justice through the law or accident prevention
through safety technology. It can be argued that the cognitive process of man
demands structured thought which tests hypotheses in a cause-effect framework.
It can also be argued that the average person as a member of the public wants
simple answers to harm-causation questions, even to the complex questions
that predominate in aviation accident investigation. Psychologically, this could
relate not only to one's earliest learning processes but also to a desire to satisfy
personal security needs. Finally, of course, requirements for cause determination
are found in accident investigation statutes. M. Braunstein & 0. F. Coleman,
"An Information-Processing Model of the Aircraft Accident Investigator," Hu-
man Factors (Feb. 1967); personal communications with Chaytor Mayson, Prof.
of Aviation Psychology, U.S.C., Los Angeles, Cal. (Mar. 1979).
""The Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
m Id.
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tions for safety purposes clearly stops short of the more exacting
cause in fact/proximate cause analysis familiar in the law of torts.
Nevertheless, he had difficulty defining causation as it applied to
investigations of aviation accidents for safety purposes. For ex-
ample, the manual states: "A cause is a fact without which (i.e.,
if it had not taken place or had taken place in a materially differ-
ent way) the event would not have taken place...... When examin-
ing the role of the accident board, Wigmore noted that
[i]t is not required that the Board pronounce upon the moral or
legal quality of any person's conduct (or failure to act) as being
negligent or blameable, or the reverse. But it is the Board's duty
and power to state all the causative facts, leaving it to others who
may have authority to pronounce any moral or legal judgment
upon those facts ...."
After reflecting upon the different standards of proof required
in civil cases (preponderance of the evidence) and in criminal
matters (proof beyond a reasonable doubt), the manual recom-
mended
that the Board ...not confine itself, in stating its conclusions,
to a choice between only two standards of belief. They may use
any terms that seem to express the strength of their belief on a
particular fact,-such as, 'We are convinced'; 'We are inclined
to believe'; 'We are clearly of the opinion'; 'We are unable to
reach any conclusion'; 'We find', etc."
Thus the element of probability was introduced into the determi-
nation of cause in aviation accident investigations.
Mr. Fred Glass, General Counsel of the Air Safety Board, has
given two reason for the application of the less rigorous definition
of causation in aviation accident investigations. First, aviation
was so new and mysterious when the definition was formulated
that even the best efforts of the investigators could give no assur-
ance of a complete determination of facts and cause. Second, the
manual made a conscious effort to separate the safety proceedings
13' Dolder, R., Inquiry Into the History of Cause and Related Procedures
(unpublished draft) (May 31, 1967).
132 DEPT. OF COMM., BUREAU OF AIR COMM., THE CONDUCT OF INVESITGA-
TIONS AND HEARINGS, § 2.642 (1938) (Manual of staff instructions drafted by
J. H. Wigmore with B. M. Jacobs and H. E. Knotts).
I- ld. § 2.643.
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and reports from the tasks of lawyers to "head off litigation." Many
people were "skittish of indictments" and were leery of the pos-
sible negative effect of communication of accident prevention in-
formation if the investigation was invaded by representatives of
litigants.'"
"Probable cause" became a trademark of CAB and NTSB
investigations, influenced by a well-received book by that title
authored by Robert Serling in 1980. This book was the first to
chronicle the task of the air safety investigator in a literary
format. Unfortunately, "probable cause" is also found in the law,
and there the confusion begins. The precise terminology of the
phrase has little to do with relationships of cause and effect as
they exist in an investigative analysis. Specifically, Black's Law
Dictionary defines "probable cause" as "an apparent state of facts
to exist upon reasonable inquiry... which would induce a reason-
ably intelligent and prudent man to believe, in a criminal case,
that the accused person had committed the crime charged . .. ."
This connotation, of course, has its heritage in the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.1"
"Probable cause" in air safety investigations has an entirely
different meaning. The NTSB accident analysts handbook defines
it as follows:
Probable Cause(s) . . . condition(s) and/or event(s) or the
collective sequence of conditions and/or events that most prob-
ably caused the accident to occur. Had the condition(s) or event(s)
been prevented or had one or more conditions and/or events
been omitted from the sequence, the accident would not occur.""
This definition is confusingly similar to the definition of proxi-
mate cause given in a legal encyclopedia, to wit, "that cause which,
in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient,
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred."" Both of the latter definitions
134Personal Communications with Fred Glass, General Counsel of the Air
Safety Board (Feb. 13, 1978).
135 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1365 (4th ed. 1957).
'3 "The right of the people to be secure . . .shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause .... U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
137 See Bureau of Aviation Safety, supra note 112, at 9, 26.
18 57 AM. JuR. 2d Negligence, § 131 at 9, 482 (1978).
1981]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
encompass the "but for" test; i.e., "but for" a given factor, the
accident would not have occurred. However, "proximate cause"
is clearly a legal concept by which a court places a limitation on
the actor's responsibility for the consequences of his conduct.""
Proximate cause connoted fault or blame, at least until the advent
of the strict liability or "no fault" doctrine. Conversely, the pur-
pose of NTSB investigations is allegedly not to establish fault or
blame or to determine the rights or liabilities of the parties.
Thus "probable cause" and "proximate cause" are often con-
fused and misused. It is an error for air safety investigators and
lawyers to fail to make the necessary fine distinctions. It is prob-
ably hopeless to expect the public ever to see and understand the
difference.
Recent Developments in Causation Philosophy
Parallel developments have recently occurred in the fields of
law and air safety which could lead to resolution of some of the
ill effects of the confusing probable cause/proximate cause di-
chotomy. In law, the simple "but for" test is an oversimplification;
multiple causation of accidents is the norm and is so recognized
by the courts."" A trend in tort law is toward the application of
the doctrine of comparative negligence which, by its definition,
encompasses multiple causation factors."4 This serves to reinforce
the view taken by Kreindler many years ago that it is not neces-
sary for a plaintiff to "individuate" a particular cause as the only
proximate cause of an accident.'"
A somewhat different approach has developed in the area of
air safety. The multiple causation theory has been appreciated by
the military from the inception of its formalized aviation accident
prevention programs.1 " The initial trend was to record the "pri-
mary" cause and the "contributing" causes. Typically, the "pri-
mary cause" would be defined as that factor which made the acci-
'
39 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, at 236 (4th ed. 1971).
14Id. at 239.
'4 Dept. of Comm., Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, 44 Fed. Reg.
2996-3019 (1979).
14 L. KREINDLER, 1 AVIATION ACCIDENT LAw § 3.11 (1971), citing Kendrick
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 265 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1959) [hereinafter cited as
KREINDLER].




dent most likely to occur and "contributing causes" would be those
actions, events, conditions or circumstances which did not cause
the accident but directly contributed to its occurrence. This de-
lineation was motivated by the military's desire to have a "hit
parade" of priority items requiring attention. It was also influ-
enced by expanded data system and computer capabilities which
matched the increased volume of events being investigated.
This analytical framework slowly disappeared and was replaced
by what the Air Force calls an "all cause" concept.1" The Army
and Navy also moved away from the notion of primary or prin-
cipal causes, even before the Air Force did so, although their
change occurred less visibly.
The current regulation governing all Air Force mishaps defines
cause as follows:
Causes are those findings which, singly or in combination with
other causes, resulted in the damage or injury that occurred. A
cause is an act, omission, condition, or circumstance which if cor-
rected, eliminated, or avoided would have prevented the mishap.
A cause may be an element of human or mechanical performance
which started or sustained the mishap sequence. An environmental
condition may be a cause if it was not avoidable. Findings which
sustained the mishap sequence, but which were normal to the
situation as it developed, are not causes .... These are often the
unavoidable effects of a preceding cause. '
According to Col. Richard H. Wood, the Air Force adopted this
definition of causes for the following reason:
The problem was that "primary cause" depended a lot on your
point of view. The word "primary" was interpreted as "most im-
portant" and the word "contributing" was interpreted as "less
important than primary". In fact, the "primary cause" was an
arbitrary point in the sequence and it was not necessarily the most
important cause in terms of what could cause another accident or
what could be done to prevent it. Furthermore, the concept of
primary cause never established what was to be done with events
that occurred after the primary cause. They certainly couldn't
contribute to an accident that had already become inevitable.'
I" The Primary Cause is Dead, AEROSPACE SAFETY, Oct. 1973.
14 USAF Reg. No. 127-4, Safety Investigation and Reporting of U.S. Air
Force Mishaps (Jan. 16, 1978).4 R. Wood, All Cause Accident Reporting System, a report submitted to
the USAF Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Norton AFB, Cal. (Apr. 27, 1974).
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According to Col. Wood, the "all cause" concept has simplified
the investigating board's task, and the data system has evolved
from simply categorizing accident causes to prioritizing preventive
actions. The analysts at the Air Force Safety Center now examine
all of the causes of accidents to effect a meaningful prevention
program, not just those which were subjectively considered to be
"primary.' 4 7
At the NTSB, attempts to move in this direction were made as
early as 1969 with only partial success. This attempt was a two-
pronged effort. The first proposal, accepted by the Board, was
to change the definition of probable cause in the analyst's hand-
book to reflect the plural nature of cause, condition and event,
so that the language would read cause(s), condition(s) and
event(s). The second proposal was a suggestion to the Safety
Board to approve the following definition of probable cause for
use in narrative reports: "[A] description of the physical nature of
the event producing injury or damage and amplified by those cause-
effect relationships about which viable and timely preventive action
can be taken in furtherance of air safety."" The Board rejected
this proposal, saying:
It is the Board's view that since the determination of probable
cause is the exclusive responsibility of the Board, it is inappro-
priate for the staff to prescribe a definition. If the Board subse-
quently decides that a definition of probable cause is necessary, it
will take such action at a later date. "
No such action has yet been taken. However, a review of recent
NTSB "blue cover" reports reveals a distinct evolution in the
narrative reports toward the primary/contributing construction of
probable cause.
In the international forum, "cause" is defined in Annex 13
as: "Action(s), omission(s), event(s), condition(s) or a combi-
nation thereof which led to the accident or incident."'" The ICAO
1'4 Letter to C. 0. Miller from Col. Richard H. Wood (Feb. 18, 1978).
141 Memorandum to the Chairman of the NTSB from the Director of the
Bureau of Av. Safety (Apr. 5, 1972).
149 Memorandum to the Gen. Manager and the Director of the Bureau of
Av. Safety, Board Decisions Concerning Certain Problems Involving the Bureau
of Aviation Safety (July 13, 1973).
150 See ICAO STANDARDS AND PRACTICES, supra note 123, at 9.
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Accident Investigation Manual suggests that the "conclusions"
of an aviation accident report should include "cause or probable
cause(s)." This suggestion is amplified by the statement that "It]he
expression of cause should be a concise statement of the reason
why the accident occurred and not an abbreviated description of
the accident. 1.. Of course, wide variation exists in the implementa-
tion of these recommended practices. For example, the United King-
dom investigation of the Trident crash near London in 1972 re-
sulted in a finding of five "immediate" causes and seven "under-
lying" causes."' Conversely, a Taiwanese civil court, discussing
a case in that country, stated that the pilot-in-command "failed
to control altitude and the accident was therefore deemed to have
arisen from pilot negligence."W5
3
Cause v. Fault
From the foregoing, it should be apparent that, given the differ-
ent objectives of aviation accident investigation and the law, a
philosophical conflict arises in the conduct of accident investiga-
tions and the reporting of findings from those investigations. In
simplistic terms it is a question of cause, with all of its variations,
versus fault. To the lay public, any person who is found guilty
of a crime, who is found liable to another for damages, or who is
simply found to have "caused" an accident will be considered to
be at fault. The public equates such findings with a "failure to do
what is right," a "responsibility for wrongdoing or failure," or a
"defect in quality or construction," all commonly accepted dic-
tionary definitions of fault."' Compare this with Prosser who
states:
"Fault" is a failure to live up to an ideal of conduct to which no
one conforms always and which may be beyond the capacity of
the individual . . . . It may consist of sheer ignorance, lack of
intelligence, or even an honest mistake. It may consist even in acts
which are the normal and usual thing in the community."
"'See ICAO Report of Meeting, supra note 124, at IV-2-6.
... UNITED KINGDOM DEP'T. OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, REPORT OF THE PUBLIC
INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACCIDENT NEAR STAINES
ON 18 JUNE, 1972 . . .TRIDENT I G-ARPI (1973).
"J. CROCKETT, PILOT SUSCEPTIBLrY TO THE COURTS (1978).
'
5 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 924 (2nd ed. 1951).
"W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §5 236, 239 (4th ed. 1971).
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He admits that such an arbitrary connotation is different from
personal guilt and moral blame, but submits that this is not im-
portant except in the descriptive sense. He argues:
There are many situations in which a person is held liable for an
entirely reasonable mistake. Socially and legally these defendants
are at fault; whether they are individually so, in spite of the fact
they are blameless, appears to be entirely a matter of definition,
rather than substance, and the argument leads only to a pointless
dispute over the meaning of the word." '
The tragedy occurs when over-simplified procedures are applied
during the fact-finding process or during the subsequent analysis
which leads to a final report. Despite protestations of the NTSB
that they do not determine blame, if NTSB reports speak of a
"failure to adhere to . . ." standards or if they phrase statements
of causes in such accusatory language, the result is an oversimpli-
fication of the multiple causation factors present in every accident.
Thus, the NTSB induces the lay public as well as itself to concen-
trate on the obvious "failure to . . ." factor of causation and to
miss many of the other factors about which something can be
done in a practical manner to prevent future accidents.
PROBLEMS OF THE INVESTIGATION IN RELATION TO
LAW AND SOCIETY
Problems During the Investigative Process
"The impact of litigation begins when the aircraft strikes the
ground...... This impact may be as simple as the crash site land-
owner resisting the influx of government investigators and gawkers
onto his property."' A more perplexing difficulty frequently arises
concerning the designation of parties to the field investigation.
Part 831.9 of the NTSB rules". permits those parties whose
employees, functions, activities or products were involved in the
15 Id.
15 Statement of Fritz L. Puls, Gen. Counsel of the NTSB, before the meeting
between the Bureau of Av. Safety and the aviation industry, Downington, Pa.
(1975).
" The first aviation litgiation in the United States entailed just these circum-
stances in 1822. A landowner was awarded $90 compensation for the damages
caused by curiosity seekers who swarmed to the scene of a balloonist's landing.
Cruise v. Swann, 19 John Rep. 381 (1822).
949 C.F.R. § 831.9 (1979).
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accident to participate in the field investigation, presumably be-
cause these parties would provide assistance to the investigator-
in-charge. This same section, however, precludes representatives of
"claimants or insurers." This limitation is actually an administrative
fiction intended to focus the investigation on fact-finding during its
critical early phase. Like most legal fictions, this one has served its
purpose well. However, it must be continuously tested as conditions
change.
For example, experts found at the scene of a crash are invari-
ably in aid of claimants or insurers. As far as the FAA is con-
cerned, it is the responsibility of each such office to provide, in
each accident investigation, the legal participation appropriate to
the accident and type of investigation conducted. Investigations
require the "full legal participation" of the appropriate counsel's
office. The duties of the legal representative include the issuance
of a report to the FAA accident coordinator/investigator upon
his arrival at the scene, the establishment of working arrange-
ments sufficient to keep the FAA coordinator informed of the
progress and development of the accident investigation, the de-
termination of whether any additional evidence should be obtained
regarding the legal aspects of the investigation, and the supervi-
sion of all statements, documents and related evidence presented
by the FAA in an accident investigation.
Despite the restrictions upon their participation contained in
section 831.9, the NTSB has often granted insurance company
representatives discrete access to the scene of accidents and has
even permitted examination of the wreckage in return for their
expeditious removal of it to a site where it can be more readily
examined by the accident investigators. Thus, as a practical mat-
ter, strict adherence to Part 831.9 often gives way to the need
for cooperation to further the accident investigation. This issue
has not been seriously tested in the courts, although some cases
dealing with it have been adjudicated. In response to a petition to
perpetuate evidence under Rules 27 (a) and 27 (c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, access to the scene of an accident re-
cently was granted to the representatives of an insurance company
who were permitted to inspect, photograph, and reconstruct the
wreckage, including all engines, systems and components. This re-
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quest involved the PSA mid-air collision in San Diego, California,
that occurred on September 25, 1978.
To many attorneys, this procedure is the critical flaw in the
aviation accident investigation system. In an overwhelming ma-
jority of cases, the wreckage has been examined and probably
has been moved to a new location within a week of the accident's
occurrence, long before the representatives of the dead or injured
passengers are prepared to conduct their own investigation. This
situation is not unique to aviation accidents, although the problem
is more pronounced in aviation because both the formal and in-
formal communications networks and the NTSB rules encourage
participation by only some of the potential litigants. In terms of
social justice, a tremendous responsibility is carried by public
representatives from the NTSB and the FAA, whether or not these
agencies recognize or accept that fact.
Closely related to the problem of the crash site examination of
wreckage is that connected with the witnessing of tests, tear-downs
and inspections of physical evidence. Under Part 831, the NTSB
will attempt to limit participation in these actions to persons who
have been formally designated parties to the investigation. The
NTSB cites the needs of the Investigator in Charge (IIC) as the
only criteria it must follow in regulating these activities."'0 Con-
venience and efficiency often require that parts be examined at
the manufacturer's facility where unique test equipment and the
manufacturer's expertise are available to the NTSB. When this
issue of restricted participation has been taken to the courts, the
petitioner's motion to observe the activity has usually been granted.
In the spirit of compromise and to avoid time-consuming court
appearances, the NTSB itself will sometimes grant "observer"
status to qualified representatives of litigants. This is particularly
true for experienced aviation attorneys who reflect an understand-
ing of the Board's safety mission when communicating on the mat-
ter. Most motions relating to the perpetuation and observation
of evidence are initiated in state courts where the petitioning coun-
sel's superior knowledge of the local court often puts the federal
government and the NTSB at a practical disadvantage.
The courts are not the only avenue for the preservation of evi-
100 See Report of the Bureau, supra note 59, at 59.
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dence. A letter to the Office of the General Counsel of the NTSB
in Washington, D.C., and, where appropriate, the Chief of the
NTSB field office possibly will prevent disposal of the wreckage.
Potential litigants can establish contact with the legal owner of
the evidence, his attorney, or his insurer and demand that the
evidence be preserved. FAA air traffic control tapes can be pre-
served by contacting the FAA Regional Counsel. This request
must be made within fifteen days of the accident since after this
time the FAA's own procedures allow destruction of the informa-
tion by a re-use of the tapes.
As for participation in NTSB public hearings, usually associated
only with accidents of major interest, the situation is somewhat
analogous to that prevailing at the scene of the accident. Part
845.10 allows the Board to order a public hearing as part of the
accident investigation whenever such is in the public interest."6'
When many of the parties' spokesmen are attorneys who, through
force of habit, often incorrectly refer to the presiding Board Mem-
ber as "Your Honor," it is difficult for an observer to perceive that
a non-adversary proceeding is being conducted. Only the airline
pilots' union and a few of the experienced airlines consistently use
non-attorneys as their spokesmen at the hearing, although all of
the parties of any significance usually have counsel immediately
available.
Selection of parties to participate at a hearing is totally at the
discretion of the presiding Board member who may choose from
among those persons, government agencies, companies and asso-
ciations who participated in the field investigation or whose special
knowledge and aeronautical skills will contribute to the develop-
ment of pertinent evidence. This discretion provides flexibility to
allow participation by such parties as government agencies and
consumer groups. Representatives of private litigants have never
been permitted to be parties to NTSB hearings, even though they
could in some cases provide expertise at least equivalent to that
of the designated parties. This policy has been appealed informally
to the NTSB on numerous occasions. The Board, however, con-
tinues to uphold its decisions, relying upon the policy announced
by the Senate Commerce Committee when it issued its report on
16149 C.F.R. S 845.10 (1979).
1981]
IOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 that NTSB hearings
"should be pursued entirely apart from civil suits arising out of
the same accident."'l
As a practical matter, the decisions as to the scope and depth
of the accident investigation are determined long before the NTSB
public hearing, generally at the Pre-Hearing Conference. Only the
presiding Board member can vary these decisions and it would
be a startling exception for him or her to do so. NTSB public
hearings do not develop probative evidence. Nevertheless, since
they do provide an excellent overview of all the evidence gathered
up to that point in the inquiry, representatives of the potential
litigants are usually present in the audience. As in most adminis-
trative hearings, however, the rules of evidence are so loosely
applied that the record is misleading if attempts are made to
utilize it in civil proceedings either directly or for purposes of
impeachment.
Similarly, the authentication and handling of evidence through-
out the entire NTSB accident investigation process leaves much
to be desired when viewed from the perspective of a litigating
attorney. Transmission forms are completed when wreckage is re-
turned to the owner or his insurance carrier. The Board will
certify that copies of material in its files are from the accident
record, but an attorney cannot depend upon the NTSB to make
observations of evidence or to record data that will satisfy a court's
scrutiny. This is one of the strongest arguments in favor of allow-
ing litigants earlier access to the investigation process than that
presently permitted.
Requests for the reconsideration or modification of Board re-
ports "will be entertained only if based on the discovery of new
evidence or on a showing that the Board's findings, as to the facts,
conditions, and circumstances of the accident, are erroneous. ' '...
These criteria do not include errors made by the Board in the
analysis of facts. The record will stand unless changes in the evi-
l2Also, four days prior to the scheduled public hearing in New York on
the Eastern Airlines Flight 66 crash at John F. Kennedy Airport on June 24,
1975, an attorney sought a temporary restraining order delaying the hearing
until the court could rule upon his motion for party status. The request was
denied on the basis that there was no "irreparable damage" and that there was
no showing that the plaintiff could be successful on the basic motion.
14349 C.F.R. S 845.41 (1979).
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dence are accepted. For this reason it is important that parties
with an interest in the case comply with the Board's rules which
specifically invite recommendations as to the proper conclusions
to be drawn from the evidence. If a party does not have an inter-
est in the case prior to the analysis of the facts, it is usually im-
possible for him to influence the findings. This time period can
be as short as one or two weeks after the accident has occurred.
In recent years the Safety Board has occasionally followed
public hearings in major cases with "technical review conferences"
at which the evidence adduced at the hearing is informally dis-
cussed. This policy has not been abandoned, contrary to the de-
sires of such groups as the Air Line Pilots Association.
It is also important to note that no system exists to return to
the NTSB or to any other safety agency the investigative findings
and judicial determinations which are made in the course of avia-
tion accident litigation. This is unfortunate since investigations
conducted by attorneys often uncover factors which were not sub-
ject to NTSB inquiry, factors which have meaning for accident
prevention as well as evidentiary value in an adversary proceed-
ing. Unless the attorney has some unique motivation for notifying
the NTSB of his findings, this information may be lost.
Availability and Use of Information Derived During NTSB
Investigations
Information compiled in the course of an aviation accident in-
vestigation will normally fall into one of the following categories
at the NTSB: the factual file which consists of factual determi-
nations made by investigators, reports which have been adopted
by the Board, transcripts of depositions and hearings, graphs,
sketches, weather sequence reports, flight and maintenance records,
and other evidentiary materials; the correspondence file, which in-
cludes communications with the Board regarding the accident under
investigation; the data recordings file, which includes cockpit voice
tapes, air traffic control tapes and flight data recorder tapes and
foil records; the analysis file, which contains a collection of ma-
terial used internally by the Board to process the accident record
from the field investigation phase to the publication of a determi-
nation of probable cause; and the recommendations fie, which
contains a collection of Board safety recommendations and com-
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ments from affected parties. In addition, two automatic data re-
trieval systems pertaining to aviation accidents are used by the
NTSB, one of which stores all of the coded information while the
other deals with recommendations.
Information in the factual and correspondence files is readily
available to the public. Data recordings, however, are normally
returned to the owner of the aircraft or destroyed after the investi-
gation. Copies are retained for training purposes and for use in
future investigations, but these are not generally made available
to the public. Until recently, the contents of the analysis file had
been considered privileged information within the exceptions of
the Freedom of Information Act.'" The Board has now found it
easier to excise material from these files when it is requested
rather than to deny all access. The accident file computer tapes
are available from the NTSB as noted in the Appendix to Part
801 of the Board's rules. The staff of the Information Systems
Division of the Board has also been helpful to organizations at-
tempting to establish their own computer-based information re-
trieval systems. The Board will honor requests for computer runs
of accident data provided that they have a direct bearing on acci-
dent prevention. This usually excludes requests from attorneys
who desire to use the information in litigation. Retrieval of com-
puterized data from the recommendation file is a recent innova-
tion at the NTSB; hence, its use by outside parties has been limited.
It is expected that the same policy will be followed for this infor-
mation as has been applied to the accident data.
The fundamental question for an attorney is how much of this
material can be used for evidentiary or impeachment purposes in
the course of developing his case. In Part 45.40 of its rules, the
Board has identified two types of reports:
(a) The Board will issue a detailed narrative accident report in
connection with the investigation into those aircraft accidents
which the Board determines to warrant such a report ....
(b) The probable cause and facts, conditions and circumstances
of all other aircraft accidents will be reported in a manner
and form prescribed by the Board.1
The narrative reports referred to in subsection (a) are the so-
1645 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-502 (1974).
1549 C.F.R. § 845.40 (1979).
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called "blue cover" reports which contain facts, analysis, findings
and a statement of probable cause. The reports of subsection (b)
consist of computer briefs which give factual data, probable cause,
factors and remarks but no analysis. Prior to the adoption of
this concept arguments arose over what constituted the Board
"reports." Generally much of what is known today as the "factual
file" was deemed inadmissible at trial on the ground of hearsay
objections and on the basis of statutory provisions. Today only
the report as defined by the Board is inadmissible. This includes
only the "blue cover" and "computer brief" reports.'6
The status of data records is presently unclear. To be valid
evidence, these recordings must be accompanied by expert testi-
mony or they will have little value to the trier of fact. Although
they are available during litigation, they require special and expen-
sive processing. The relaxed NTSB rules regarding testimony of
its employees find clear support in the case law. Beech Aircraft
v. Harvey,"' Keen v. Detroit Diesel,"8 and Seymour v. United
States.. are recent decisions which endorse the case upon which
the Board relied in formulating its rules, Kline v. Martin"
Beech Aircraft and Keen traced the rationale back further to
Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, a 1963 case.'' The court in Keen
was particularly articulate in reviewing the history of the NTSB/
FAA employee testimony question and was "persuaded that the
standards set forth in Berguido . . . and Kline control in the an-
alysis and interpretation of § 1441 (e) ."' This section reads: "Use
of records and reports as evidence.-No part of any report or re-
ports of the Board relating to any accident or the investigation
thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action
for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report
or reports." In other words, the test for admissibility of testimony in
"I See KREINDLER, supra note 13, ch. 18; Galardi, Use of Civil Aero-
nautics Board Investigation Materials in Civil Litigation, 32 BROOKLYN L. REV.
58 (1965).
167 Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Harvey, 558 P.2d 879 (Alaska 1976).
168Keen v. Detroit Diesel Allison, 569 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1978).
"'Seymour v. United States, 15 Av. CAS. 17,141 (1978).
"'Kline v. Martin, 345 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Va. 1972).
'Berquido v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963).
"'Keen v. Detroit Diesel Allison, 569 F.2d 547, 551 (10th Cir. 1978); 49
U.S.C. § 144(e) (1976) (§ 304(10)(c) of the Independent Safety Board Act
of 1974).
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Keen relates to the same criteria as that derived for ascertaining the
admissibility of the "report." Anything short of providing an opin-
ion as to the probable cause of an accident would probably be
admissible. Seymour did not go quite as far in allowing testimony
as it not only excluded opinion testimony "when it embraces prob-
able cause of accident"' " but also that pertaining to the "negli-
gence of the defendant."17
4
.Another information availability problem that involves ques-
tions of both law and safety is the issue of the confidentiality of
communications with investigators. This author, along with many
other persons, has been concerned about the threat to safety com-
munications brought about by complete absence of a privilege for
accident inquiry interrogation. ' Such views have been met with
objections from respected practicing attorneys who do not believe
that significant information to aid in accident prevention could be
gained through imposing confidentiality for such communications.
Regardless of which view is correct, it is generally appreciated
that due process protections for individuals and organizations can
be seriously jeopardized if all participants are not aware of and
do not take care to adhere to the same rules regarding confi-
dentiality. The NTSB rules regarding the confidentiality of infor-
mation contained in any report or document or any other infor-
mation obtained pursuant to provisions of its enabling legislation
are explicit. A request to guarantee the confidentiality of such
information must be in writing and must be approved by the
Board. The Board may also order, on its own initiative, that such
information be withheld to protect the public interest."' This policy
relates to § 1104 of the FAA Act which deals more with matters
affecting United States foreign relations than it does with investi-
gation communications. The language is clearly a remnant of the
CAB's earlier functions. In any case, it can be argued that the
Sunshine Act has probably negated the dictate of § 1104.
'7 Seymour v. United States, 15 Av. CAs. 5 17,141 (1978).
174 Id.
175 M. Miller, Legal Ramifications of Aircraft Accident/Malfunction Data,
Proceedings of the IAS National Systems Reliability Symposium, Salt Lake City,
Utah (April 16, 1962); Address by C. Miller, The Engineer, Lawyer and Flight
Safety, presented at the SAE-ASNE National Aero-Nautical Meeting, Washing-
ton, D.C. (Apr. 9, 1963).
17-49 C.F.R. S 831.5 (1979).
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A final problem regarding the availability and use of NTSB/
FAA accident information surrounds foreign accidents. The inter-
est of the United States in such accidents is extensive because of
its citizens' predominance in the manufacture of aircraft used
throughout the world. Ninety to ninety-five percent of the free
world's air carrier aircraft bear the labels of American companies
as do about eighty percent of the free world's general aviation air-
craft."' Furthermore, United States carriers and aviation corpora-
tions operate in all corners of the globe.
Under Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention"' and upon noti-
fication by the state in which the accident has occurred, the state
of the aircraft's registration has the right to send an accredited
representative to participate in the investigation. The state in
which the aircraft was manufactured has a similar right to partici-
pate in the investigation upon the invitation of the state in which
the accident occurred. The NTSB provides accredited representa-
tion through the State Department; however, the Board will often
recommend that the task be assigned to FAA personnel. In either
instance, employees of the operator or manufacturer or other non-
governmental advisors often accompany the government officials.
Until the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act
and the recognition of its ramifications, accredited United States
representatives freely returned with factual information from for-
eign accidents. If requested, they would provide assurances to the
state in which the accident occurred that the privileged nature of
the information would be respected. ' The turning point in this
procedure came in 1974 at the time of the Paris DC-10 crash.
NTSB investigators and advisors in this and other foreign accidents
had been subjected to extensive depositions, and the existence of
notes and other documentation acquired during discovery pro-
ceedings became a matter of international concern. Finally, the
Safety Board instructed its personnel not to bring back any docu-
mentation. The Board later unsuccessfully sought statutory relief
in this area with an amendment to the Government in the Sun-
177 Telephone conversation with James McCarthy, Air Transp. Ass'n of
America (Aug. 2, 1979). Personal communication with Steven Varsano, General
Av. Mfgrs. Ass'n (Aug. 2, 1979).
See ICAO, STANDARDS AND PRACTICES, supra note 117.
179See id. 5 5.12 for current provisions in this regard.
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shine Act proposed by Senator Edward Kennedy.18
The September, 1979 meeting of the Accident Prevention and
Investigation Division of the ICAO contained an agenda item,
"'Freedom of Information' Legislation and Annex 13, Paragraph
5.12-Disclosure of Records." There was discussion regarding a
working paper which proposed as follows:
a) Confirm the need for specification 5.12 of Annex 13, re-
garding the privilege status to be granted certain investigation
records; and
b) Consider possible solutions to the problems which may arise
when the State conducting the investigation releases documenta-
tion and Final Reports to States with "Freedom of Information"
legislation.
The working paper cited above also was explicit in stressing
the need for "frank, open, and full information" and the "need to
protect [investigators'] sources of information" in the interest of
accident prevention. It acknowledges the increasing incidence of
"Freedom of Information" legislation throughout the world but
states that disclosure of accident investigation records for purposes
other than those of accident and incident investigation, including
litigation, contravenes the spirit and objective of Annex 13. An in-
terim solution which has been proposed and sometimes followed is
the forwarding of information only to embassies of the state in which
the accident occurred and the state of the aircraft's registration,
with instructions to limit review to specified persons. Whereas these
concerns were discussed by the meeting's participants, no signifi-
cant progress was made. Thus we see that questions which have
been raised in the United States during the last two decades con-
cerning the dissemination of information are now expanding into
the international sphere of aviation activity.
Scope, Depth and Accuracy of Investigations
No discussion of accident investigation would be complete with-
out addressing the importance of the quality of accident investiga-
tions and of the process of gathering evidence. Certain investigative
functions, such as witness interrogation and a records search,
must be begun as soon as possible after the accident. Some tasks,
18 Proposed amendment to S. 2661 by Sen. Kennedy (D. Mass.), 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976).
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such as the reconstruction of impact dynamics, can only be ac-
complished at the scene of the accident. Some work, such as the
examination of failed components, must be done with the utmost
care at the accident scene and in the laboratory. If the investiga-
tion is not done quickly and correctly, the damage to future in-
terests and rights may be irreversible.
Thus it becomes important to distinguish the roles of the NTSB,
the FAA and attorneys in the investigation. The reputation of the
agency notwithstanding, the NTSB takes a relatively broad view of
the scope appropriate for accident investigations. The FAA takes
a narrower view based upon the Federal Air Regulations and upon
its own operating manuals. Even when it presumably is function-
ing on behalf of the NTSB, the FAA inquiries are more limited
and more enforcement-oriented than those of the NTSB investi-
gators. The attorney involved in the investigation also takes a
narrower view than does the NTSB, but he will usually embark
upon a more in-depth investigation than either the NTSB or
FAA. He tends to focus on the theory that will secure recovery
or aid the defense of his client, although he must look at other
theories if they are raised by his adversary. In any event it is not
surprising that as a matter of policy the NTSB does not acquire,
retain or protect information to the degree required by other per-
sons, including litigants.
In terms of the accuracy of the investigations, the situation is
somewhat different. Errors by any party can be damaging to that
party or to others. Unfortunately, in the areas of scope, depth
and accuracy, the NTSB investigations in recent years have been
deficient. The reasons for this are many but they do not include
personal performance factors related to the individual investi-
gators. The professional staff is comprised of highly competent,
hard-working persons who are attempting to do a credible job.
They suffer not only from the instability of aviation leadership but
also from the misallocation of the limited available resources for
aviation investigation, resources which have proven inadequate for
the numerous and increasingly complex aircraft accidents.
In the fall of 1974, the total number of NTSB personnel was
271, 151 of whom were within the Bureau of Aviation Safety.
The technical staff of the Bureau, those whose direct function was
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the investigation of aviation accident and follow-up action, num-
bered 108. This group was composed of sixty-nine air safety in-
vestigators who could be expected to spend the vast majority of
their time working with field investigations; seventeen technical
support staff members, such as laboratory personnel and data an-
alysts; and twenty-two aviation unit supervisors who were all
qualified air safety investigators.' This figure represented ten to
twelve percent fewer staff members than were present in the
Bureau of Safety in the CAB in 1963. A study of the 378 NTSB
personnel employed during the fall of 1978 produced figures
similar to those in 1974. One hundred eleven persons were as-
signed to or were available for aviation investigations. This figure
included fifty-two air safety investigators whose responsibilities
were solely aviation-oriented. Thirty-seven support personnel and
twenty-two supervisors also could participate in such investiga-
tions. However, these support personnel and supervisors all be-
longed to groups which had multiple responsibilities. The one
exception, the chief of the Aviation Accident Division, held the
only pure aviation supervisory position in the entire NTSB.
A Freedom of Information Act request propounded in the
course of this study revealed that the NTSB was unable to provide
data for actual expenditures of manpower related to aviation prior
to February, 1977. ' The only full year for which data was avail-
able was the 1978 fiscal year (October, 1977 through September,
1978); this data indicated that 341,553 man-hours had been ex-
pended for all activities applied to aviation. Accident/incident
investigations occupied 178,228 man-hours or approximately fifty-
two percent of total aviation activity. Using an average of 1,920
hours of technical staff man-hour expenditures per year, these
figures translate into ninety-three equivalent staff members working
on accident/incident investigations out of a total aviation effort of
177 equivalent personnel (including administrative support).
Thus it appears that at best the NTSB is not applying more
8 These and subsequent data in this discussion are based upon studies made
by the Office of the Director, BAS, in 1973 and 1974, identification of staff mem-
bers shown in NTSB telephone directories in October '74 and September '78
and inquiries of personnel who had retired from NTSB where the names of
assignments were not recognized by the author. Due allowances were made for
job title and organizational changes.
182 Letter to C. 0. Miller from B. Michael Levins (May 7, 1979).
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manpower to aviation now than it did in 1974, and that the
amount is probably significantly less. In 1974, all of the 151
people in the BAS were working in aviation, and some proportion
of the remaining eighty non-BAS NTSB personnel also would have
been working in that area. Certainly such a combined effort would
exceed that of the 177 personnel shown in the NTSB data for
1978. Further, it is reasonable to conclude that the nominal in-
crease in the number of technical staff available for aviation mat-
ters in 1978 (111 compared to 108) is offset by the divided tech-
nical and supervisory responsibility of the fifty-nine people who
support the fifty-two field investigators.
The resource situation is not expected to change. Not only is
the 1980 socio-economic climate unfavorable to increased agency
budgets, but the safety success record in aviation also remains
relatively high. Except for the occasional high visibility accident,
such as the Chicago crash of the DC-10 where no bounds on in-
vestigative resources were observed, there is no perception within
NTSB management that an air safety manpower problem exists.
The result has been a diminished level of quality in investigations,
especially those in general aviation.
To the professional air safety investigator, this has become a
matter of frustration; it is so severe that several highly qualified
investigators from both the NTSB and FAA have taken "early
retirement." To aviation attorneys, it has meant an increasing
burden to pursue investigations earlier and to use more expert
assistance. To the public, it has led to a misplaced confidence in
the investigative job performed by the NTSB and FAA.
CONCLUSION
Tracing the history of the aviation accident investigation process
in the United States reveals several precepts which have stood the
test of time. First and foremost among these is the "blood pri-
ority" syndrome." When catastrophes such as the Paris or Chicago
DC-10 crashes catch the public eye because of the high number
of fatalities, or when an accident such as the Cutting crash arouses
public interest because of the notoriety of one of the deceased
persons, an investigation will flourish and changes will probably
"'a Address by Maj. Gen. John D. Stevenson, Ideas and Realities, presented
at the First Ann. USAF Safety Cong., Riverside, Cal. (Sept. 12, 1960).
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result. Another influence upon accident investigations is the loca-
tion and timing of a given accident. The TWA B727 crash which
occurred while the aircraft was approaching Washington's Dulles
airport came in the same year as the Paris DC-10 crash, a time
when the political climate was sensitive."' In contrast, when a
Boeing 747 flown by the Iranian Air Force crashed in Spain on
May 9, 1976, due most likely to its being struck by lightning, a
comprehensive technical investigation ensued but follow-up action
has been lax.18' Although this accident had significant ramifica-
tions for air safety, few persons, even those within the aviation com-
munity, have heard about the incident. Litigation related to the in-
cident was minimal since only seventeen persons were killed. Ulti-
mately, three climates exist which govern the investigative process:
technological, political and legal. The attorney or air safety investi-
gator must be aware of all three and must act accordingly.
History also has demonstrated that there is a need for inde-
pendent investigations. Little argument exists today for the NTSB
concept of investigative authority separate from the regulatory
agency. The increasing complexity of the aviation system and its
growing interaction with the law has produced better qualified
and better organized participants in the system. More attorneys
trained in the field of aviation appear at hearings and trials,
and more air safety specialists are becoming knowledgeable of
the law. Communications have improved immeasurably in this
area, due to the annual air law symposiums sponsored by the
Southern Methodist University School of Law, the Lawyer Pilots
Bar Association's publications and meetings, and an influx of
courses on law and safety at the university level. In addition, all
parties to major aviation inquiries now have standby go-teams
of their own; until only a few years ago such preparation was
limited to the airline operators, the pilots' union, and to the large
manufacturers. '
1
"NTSB Aircraft Accident Rep. No. AAR175-16, Trans World Airlines,
Boeing 727-231, N 54328, Berryville, Virginia (Dec. 1, 1974).18 8NTSB Special Investigation Rep., Wing Failure of Boeing 747-131 Near
Madrid, Spain (May 9, 1976); Letter to C. 0. Miller from Chairman James B.
King, NTSB (Jan. 30, 1979).
Ie It is not uncommon now in a major crash to see included among the
parties the general aviation manufacturer, the Professional Air Traffic Controller
Association (PATCO), the Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), the Air-
craft Owner & Pilots Association (AOPA), the National Business Aircraft
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The public's right and desire to be informed continues to grow.
Influenced by the questions raised by Watergate, there is no
longer any doubt that a government investigation must be open
and that views of the participants can be expected to surface pub-
licly during the resulting litigation, if not sooner. Closely allied
to this precept is the continuing deep-rooted association of the
concepts of cause and blame in the minds of the public, the media
and members of the Congress. No change in this attitude has been
discernible over the years. Finally, civil challenges to administra-
tive procedures associated with investigations continue to provide
a dynamic input to improving these procedures. This should not be
surprising to any person familiar with the metabolism of law and
should reassure others that the democratic process' system of
checks-and-balances is alive and well.
The most complex and most difficult problem to be solved is
the lack of understanding of the role of causal determination in
accident prevention and in legal proceedings. Since the objectives
and methodology of a safety investigation differ fundamentally
in many respects from those implicit in a legal action, it is desir-
able to separate safety findings from determinations of legal re-
sponsibility to the greatest degree practicable. Today's system at
the NTSB to accomplish this is a sham, illustrated by the blame-
oriented descriptions used in their accident coding system and the
Safety Board's attitudes toward "probable cause."
The deteriorating scope, depth and accuracy of the NTSB/FAA
aircraft investigations is approaching the level of a national em-
barrassment. Instead of being a leader in this field, the United
States government seems to be unwilling to provide the resources,
leadership or motivation necessary to improve investigative tech-
niques and procedures. A typical example is the well-known de-
ficiency of human factors investigations. Despite repeated identi-
fication of the problem, little attention has been given to it at the
NTSB or FAA.18 '
Association (NBAA), and the Aviation Consumer Action Project (ACAP). All
of these have made special effort to train personnel for investigation participation.
17Address by C. Miller, Legal and Litigation Barriers to the Communication
of Human Factors Safety Information, presented at the Flight Safety Founda-
tion Seminar, Williamsburg, Va. (Nov. 12, 1974); proceedings of the Air Line
Pilots Association Symposium on Human Factors, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 8,
1977).
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An imbalance exists among the parties to the field investiga-
tions of general aviation accidents and, to a lesser extent, among
the parties to NTSB public hearings. As long as the NTSB or
FAA refuse to allow more representatives of injured parties to
participate in the field investigations, the NTSB/FAA investiga-
tions will continue to be deficient in the gathering and protection
of evidence. Plagued by this system, the adversary process in civil
litigation cannot function to give adequate social justice. The cur-
rent public hearing process is now acceptable since the only cases
that reach such a forum have so many adverse parties little addi-
tional evidence would surface through more non-governmental
representation. Also, the media's investigative reporters tend to
put pressure on NTSB panel chairmen during the large public
hearings; hence they have become parties representing the public.
There is reason to believe that because of the excessive work-
load, the inadequacy of investigations, or the questionable nature
of some board members' qualifications, some views of parties asso-
ciated with a particular case are not communicated or understood
by the Board's members. Petitions for reconsideration of the deter-
mination of cause or, more importantly, for changes in the report
to present a fuller presentation or discussion of the facts, appear
to be treated summarily and without the objectivity which normally
characterize the Board's actions. It is rare for the Board to pre-
sent in its report the contrary views of competent parties unless
one of the members elects, to write a minority opinion supporting
such a view. Such dissents are infrequent.
The difficulty of assuring meaningful fact-finding and com-
munication of information from foreign accident investigations
continues to place unfair burdens on United States citizens and
manufacturers and operators involved in litigation. Procedures for
any attorney representing such clients are ad hoc at best. An un-
fair ethical burden is placed upon the investigators who may wish
to communicate information which may aid in preventing acci-
dents when they return from a foreign investigation, as legal and
procedural constraints inhibit their doing so. This is a variation
of the larger continuing problem of restrictions on the exchange
of safety information within the aviation community because of
legal constraints, real or imagined.
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Closely associated with this problem is the parochialism that
runs between many accident investigators and attorneys associated
with aviation cases, as neither recognizes the mutually supportive
objectives of accident prevention and social justice. The restric-
tions on information access and control, which vary somewhat
between the two groups, are not recognized by the participants
themselves nor are they acknowledged in their published doctrines.
Lastly, a mechanism for feedback does not exist, or is not being
utilized, to communicate valuable accident prevention information
which is gained during investigations made for purposes of litiga-
tion. On numerous occasions during this author's experience as a
consultant, facts were discovered, analyses performed and general
(not just judicial) agreement was reached as to facts which were
different from those found in the NTSB docket. It would appear
that the NTSB would be interested in such information, not only
to improve the accuracy of the accident record but also to indi-
cate the quality of their investigations.
Recommendations
To be effective, a recommendation must not only describe the
task to be done with an achievable reasonableness, but it also
must identify the party who will assume this task. Since the NTSB
is the government agency with the statutory responsibility for
aviation accident investigation, most of the recommendations pre-
sented below fall within their realm. Other readers of this study
who agree with the author should also do what they can to en-
dorse or otherwise implement the following recommendations.
The NTSB should issue a notice of proposed rule-making, citing
their past use of the concept of "probable cause" and inviting
comments in anticipation of a change in the definition, or, pre-
ferably, the elimination of the requirement through legislation.
The NTSB should convert its data collection and recording sys-
tem to an "all cause" concept if causal determination is to be
maintained or, in the alternative, it should change to a remedial
action concept for recording investigation results to determine
the potential preventive steps identified in the accident. The
NTSB should effect a procedure so that all parties whose repu-
tation, potential recovery or liability may be at issue are allowed
to be represented at all phases of the investigation by qualified
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air safety investigators. In conjunction with this procedure, the
Society of Air Safety Investigators should develop and implement
a certification program for air safety investigators.
The NTSB should include summaries in its reports of the sig-
nificant views of qualified parties which are contrary to the opin-
ions of the NTSB staff or to findings by the Board. Use of the
technical review conferences after the field fact-finding investiga-
tion and the public hearing is encouraged. The NTSB should
delineate policies and procedures to define the minimum standards
acceptable for all investigations, especially those in the human
factors area. If existing economic constraints preclude satisfactory
adherence to the desired standards of investigative proficiency,
the total number of cases investigated by the NTSB should be re-
duced and the remaining cases should be remanded to other
agencies which may apply whichever investigative efforts they
choose. A distinction between these cases should appear in the
NTSB annual summaries of accidents. The NTSB should form
an Aviation Accident Investigation Advisory Committee, possibly
part of a larger group, whose membership would be drawn from
the public-at-large as well as from the legal advisors and other
parties who normally participate in Board investigations and hear-
ings. Alternatively, the Board should hold bi-annual meetings to
ensure that it receives comprehensive feedback concerning the
conduct of its operations.
The NTSB should modify its organization to encompass an
aviation program manager concept, ensuring that adequate em-
phasis is given to aviation matters. The senior official over avia-
tion matters should be placed at a civil service grade level equiva-
lent to that of intermodal functional chiefs. This would not only
ensure that quality air safety investigation advice is being given
but would also be an effective point of contact and coordination on
aviation safety technical matters. The American Bar Association,
particularly the Aviation Committee, should develop a process so
that findings concerning aviation accidents which are derived from
litigation can be fed back to NTSB accident records, even if the sys-
tem is nothing more than a citation reference system. A committee
of the Society of Air Safety Investigators, comprised of both air
safety specialists and attorneys or, alternately, a joint venture of the
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Society with the Aviation Committee of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, should develop a policy statement regarding privilege and
the acquisition and dissemination of information for the purpose
of accident prevention as opposed to litigation. This statement
should also address the issues raised by foreign accidents.

